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4INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Moldova is a young state, created along with the other Newly 
Independent States (NIS) in 1991 after the implosion of the Soviet Union. After the 
Baltic States, on 24th August 1991, the Ukrainian parliament adopted the 
independence declaration, followed on 25th by Belarus. On 27th August, the 
“sovereign, independent, democratic and free” Republic of Moldova was proclaimed.
Many Moldovans considered that the act of independence was the first step towards 
the re-unification with Romania, the mother country of a territory subject of centurial 
foreign occupation and clashes of cultures and history. However, the prospect of 
return to Romania was soon turn down because of numerous reasons (the most 
important being the confused and weak national identity of a population that 
underwent decades of Russification under the rule of the Russian Empire and Soviet 
Union) and Moldovan authorities engaged in the complicated task of building the 
state of the newly proclaimed republic. 
Foreign affairs were a domain of special importance for the new leadership in 
Chişinău since the Republic of Moldova sought international recognition and support 
of the external community, as well as the membership of various regional, continental 
and transatlantic organisations. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established 
in the aftermath of Moldova’s declaration of independence inherited the institutional   
and conceptual weaknesses of its Soviet predecessor and failed to define explicitly 
the foreign priorities of the country, unlike the Baltic States that declared immediately
the membership of the European Union and NATO to be their primary foreign-policy 
objective (Leancă, 2002). In contrast, Moldovan leaders opted for a multidimensional 
character of foreign affairs, i.e. of balancing between East and West. 
More importantly, the Republic of Moldova has hesitated in making a clear 
choice regarding its European orientation and has signed up to the programs of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at the Alma-Ata conference, which put 
an end to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The CIS was perceived as a 
solution to Moldova’s economic problems appeared as a consequence of dismantling 
of the Soviet block. Yet, Moldova is facing serious problems at the moment, both on 
the political and economic levels, while the transition process hit seriously its 
population. Compared to the former Soviet Baltic republics, reforms in certain sectors 
have failed and the integration into European organizations is far from coming true. 
5The applications of East-Central European countries and the Baltic States have been 
approved at the Copenhagen summit in late 2002, with Romania and Bulgaria being 
already at the doors of the European Union. This way, it became crystal clear that 
Moldova, along with its neighbouring Ukraine and Belarus, is going to be excluded for 
a foreseeable future from the process of eastward enlargement of the European 
Union. 
Since independence, Moldova’s leadership, as well as its population, have been 
divided between those who pledged to withdraw from the CIS, as a pre-condition to 
Moldova’s European Integration, and those who were in favour of preserving closer 
links with the Russian Federation and the CIS group of countries. A large part of 
politicians and diplomats in Chişinău embraced the idea of compatibility between 
Moldova’s simultaneous integration within Eastern and Western systems to the 
extent of the „perfect” suitability of the CIS membership and eventual quality EU 
member state. Nevertheless, the European Union has recently turned upside down 
this assumption through the voice of the Chairman of the Joint Parliamentary 
Cooperation Committee EU-Moldova, Jan Marinus Wiersma, who stated that 
Moldova will have to choose between the CIS or the EU, in the case of a deeper 
European integration (BBC, 2003). 
What role was played by the lack of political will and its double-faced foreign 
policy in slowing Moldova down on its journey “back to Europe”? To what extent did 
Russia’s political influence and economic pressure thwart Moldova’s efforts to 
become member of the European Union? Does Moldova’s Eastern orientation, 
especially its CIS membership, inhibit its European aspirations? These are the 
questions that I want to address in the present paper. 
The first chapter will present a historic framework of the territory on which the 
state the Republic of Moldova has been established since such an exercise will 
facilitate a better understanding of the developments in the country after its 
proclamation of independence and will place in a better defined context the 
dimensions of its foreign-policy. The second major part of the work will examine the 
Eastern vector of Moldova’s foreign affairs, i.e. the relations with Russia Federation 
and Ukraine (as far as its implication in the decade frozen secessionist conflict is 
concerned), the quality of the member state of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and the Transnistrian issue. The third chapter will study the Western 
orientation of Moldova, a special emphasis being placed on its relations with 
Romania and the EU as such. How the simultaneous movement towards East and 
6West have influenced each other and determined Moldova’s current place on the 
map of the New Europe forms the last part of my research. The primary focus will be 
on analysis of high-level orientations in Moldova and its diplomacy, other economic, 
social, military or cultural factors being only raised, but not studied in depth. 
My hypothesis is that concomitant integration into the CIS and the EU is a 
contradiction in terms given the different set of values, aims and regulations existing 
in both regions. Accordingly, the Eastern course hampered Moldova’s efforts to 
become a member of the Union and a viable partner in other Occident structures, 
and inhibited its European aspirations so far.  
The methodology that I will use during my research will be analytical and 
comparative, based on the examples of Baltic countries – former Soviet republics 
and successful candidates in the EU and NATO accession. I will also study the role 
played by political leaders and their weak identity in identifying a strategic direction of 
Moldova on the external level. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union constitutes a recent event of the modern 
history; that is why there is a lack of consistent literature concerning the situation and 
developments of former Soviet republics, Moldova counting among them. While the 
East-Central European countries enjoyed considerable attention and constant 
preoccupation from the side of the European academic and research circles, the 
study on Moldova has been rather sporadic and limited. There are few studies 
regarding Moldova’s foreign affairs and even less are examining the outcome of its 
participation into the CIS policies. Thus, the assessment of efficiency of the Eastern 
trend as an obstacle to the European one is necessary, but complicated at the same 
time. Therefore, the key literature for my research will be the following primary 
sources: acts adopted by the leadership of Moldova and its statements in respect to 
the foreign-policy of the country; documents adopted by the European Union and 
other European organizations concerning Moldova; periodicals, newspapers, news 
agencies and opinion polls; interviews with officials, foreign-policy makers, political 
analysts and researchers in Moldova, as well as in the United Kingdom. I will also 
take a closer look at Russia’s statements, documents and newspapers on the same 
subject. The secondary sources for my MA work will include primarily books and 
studies on Moldova, Russia’s foreign affairs and the EU enlargement to the East. In 
addition, I will use the knowledge that I have gained in my capacity of researcher in 
Moldova in the last four years. I have systematically surveyed the available sources 
in English, Romanian and Russian regarding the topic of the present paper, which 
7aims to contribute to this field of study, especially that there is too little academic 
work on this subject and no similar hypothesis has been formulated.
CHAPTER I. HISTORIC REFERENCES 
It is not easy to present the Republic of Moldova from a historic perspective both 
to a wider public and a specialist reader since it has a complex and complicated 
history, which is still disputable and lags far away from a consensus between the 
implicated parts. Republic of Moldova is a young state – it was created in 1991 after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union on the base of the Soviet Socialistic Republic with 
the same name - but references regarding its historic territories and inhabitants can 
be traced back to the space of Carpathian Mountains and Danube river, while the 
founding myths go back to the wars of 101-102 and 105-106 between the Romans 
and Dacians, both of the parts constituting the origins of Romanians. 
Moldova is the second Romanian state that was created. The first one, Ţara 
Românească (Romanian country), was settled down in 1330 after the famous victory 
8at Posada of Basarab voivode over the Hungarian King, Carol Robert de Anjou1. 
Moldova appeared in the middle of the same century as a principality after the 
defensive campaign against the Tatars in the eastern part of Carpathian Mountains 
led by Dragoş prince. This came to be considered the foundation stone of the 
Principalty of Moldova, known as “Descălecatul lui Dragoş” (The settling down of 
Dragoş). Soon after his establishment he was overthrown by his rivals, the Bogdan’s 
family, which is named by the modern historiography the “Dynasty of Muşatini” after 
the name of a women, Margareta-Muşata. The dynasty set up the heart of the 
principality around the Moldova River. Initially, the Principality of Moldova was the 
vassal of the Hungarian Kingdom2. However, during 1364-1365, the Hungarian King 
was forced to recognize the independency of the second Romanian state with its 
capital in Baia, due to international constraints and local resurgent.  
The Principality of Moldova strengthened considerably its positions once the 
territorial completion was finished under Roman I (1392-1394), which proclaimed 
himself “the ruler of Moldova country from the Mountain to the Sea”. Documents 
revealed that Tatars were drove away over the Nistru River by Moldovan voivodes 
during 1391-1399, which set up here the Hotin, Soroca and Tighina fortresses. 
Moldova was bordering Ţara Românească on the Milcov River and controlled the 
flowering Genovese fortress Moncastro (Cetatea Albă) that had its borders on the 
Nistru liman3 . Under the command of voivode Alexandru cel Bun (1400-1432), 
Moldova went through an important political and ecclesiastic organization. His long 
rule was characterized by stability, cultural and political achievements, and a skilful 
foreign policy balanced between Hungary and Poland. Moldova of Alexandru cel Bun 
won the control of another thriving Genovese fortress, Chilia. In order to oversee and 
secure the commercial roads that linked the south of Poland to the Danube River’s 
apertures (Cetatea Albă and Chilia fortresses) from Hungarian attacks, Alexandru cel 
Bun recognized the suzerainty of the Polish ruler, Vladislav Iajello. But, once with the 
agreement signed between Poland and Hungary in 1412, Moldova faced its first 
division of foreign spheres of influence. However, the agreement was not fulfilled due 
                                              
1 This is one of the key-dates of the History of Romanians. Boia, L. “România. Ţară de frontieră a 
Europei” (România. Borderland of Europe)”, p.56, Humanitas, 2002
2 In order to maintain a relative freedom, Moldova’s voivodes accept either to be vassals of the 
Hungarian King or to become vassals of another king, the rival of the Hungarian one, i.e. Poland’s 
King. Djuvara, N. “O scurtă istorie a românilor povestită celor tineri” (A short history of Romanians told 
to the young), p. 58, Humanitas, 2002
3 Lazarescu, D. A. “În ce chip şi de cîte ori a pierdut poporul român Basarabia” (How and for how 
many times did the Romanian people lose Basarabia), România Liberă, 2002
9to constant fights between Polish and Hungarian Kings, and also because Moldovan 
voivode has always honoured its obligations in the front of the Polish ruler. 
The following century has marked the apogee of the medieval Moldova, under 
the authority of the most important voivode of this period, Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt. 
His domination (1457-1504), the longest one in the principality’s history, was marked 
by constant battles with the Ottoman Empire. Turks had started their expansion in 
Balkans in the middle of fourteenth century. By the end of the century, Ottomans 
reached the Danube River, on the border of the Romanian country (Ţara 
Românească). Once with conquer of Constantinople in 1453, the Christians lost 
irreversibly their influence in Balkans. 
The three Romanian states (Ţara Românească, Moldova and Transylvania) 
were situated in the first line of the Turkish expansion.  By the end of 1418, Ţara 
Românească had to accept the Ottoman suzerainty and pay tribute to it, loosing its 
access to the North Sea. In Moldova, resistance against Turks lasted up to 1547, 
when, after more than thirty/forty battles with Ottomans, Ştefan cel Mare had to give 
up and pay tribute, loosing Cetatea Albă and Chilia fortresses, and also the south of 
Moldova. So Romanians had no more exit to the sea. The loss of the two fortresses 
brought in serious problems for the economy of Moldova, which was deprived from 
the main important sources of its development – transit trade and reach markets. 
In 1600, as a result of the fights between boyars for the throne, the ruler of 
Transylvania and Ţara Românească, Mihai Viteazul, installed its power in Moldova. It 
was for the first time when the three Romanian states were united under the same 
sceptre4. Although the “unification” did not last long, Moldova and Ţara Românească 
were getting even more closer: they had similar institutions, the language spoken on 
their territories was basically identical and cultural links became stronger. The idea of 
common origins was a constant feature of historic writing in both countries. Even 
their relationship to the Ottoman Empire was similar – both were dependent on it. 
Romanian countries were later on totally included in the political, military and 
economic Ottoman system. Turks started to do away with Romanian rulers, i.e. to 
name and remove them. By the eighteen century, they became already simply 
Ottoman servants and their title was equivalent to that of pasha, thus of second 
category, not even the first one (Boia, L. 2002). Nevertheless, the Romanian 
countries never lost their autonomy - they kept their own institutions, they had their 
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own law and customs, the local leadership and aristocracy were not destroyed - and 
there was not a Turkish colonialism. Meanwhile, the Russian Empire began its 
expansion to the southeastern Europe. Petru the Great (1683-1725) aimed to reach 
Constantinople after its fall and defeat the Ottoman Empire. In his way to 
Constantinople, Petru I had to cross Romanian countries, which became a battlefield 
between Turks and Russians in the eighteen and nineteen centuries. The Russian 
Empire failed in its ambitions and did not succeed to fight the Turks. However, in May 
1812, it annexed Moldova’s territory between the Prut and Nistru5 and the southern 
part of Moldova, while the Austro-Hungarians occupied the northern part of Moldova, 
Bucovina, in 1775. 
In their attempt to fight and resist the Russian and Austria-Hungarian power, by 
seeking the support of another foreign power, Romanians have oriented towards 
France. Even after the collapse of Napoleon, France remained to be the best ally of
Romanian countries, due to the cultural relationship between them: both of the 
languages belong to the Latin/Romanic family. A period of exceptional French 
influence sprang up in the nineteenth century (even up to the middle of the twenty 
century) in the whole Romanian society, in which all intellectuals became soon fluent 
in French. It is not surprisingly, thus, that Romanian students in France were so 
enthusiastic about the changes that occurred in the French society, as well as in the 
whole Europe during 1815-1848, after the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte. These 
students were the ones who tried to organize an insurrection in Moldova, but the 
coup was hunt out and the revolution ended before it even began. However, in Ţara 
Românească, the radical youth managed to organise the masses that reached 
Bucharest and asked for the abolition of nobility and convocation of new elections. 
The voivode resigned and left the country, and a new government was installed in 
power here, which initiated radical changes, such as the liberation of gypsies. 
Another ideal of the revolutionary forces was the Unification of Principalities, although 
it was not admitted officially, given the fear of Russian and Ottoman attacks, which 
were not long in coming. 
                                                                                                                                              
4 On the coins it was said: “Mihai Viteazul – Voivode of Muntenia (Ţara Românească – n. a.), 
Transylvania and Moldova”. Djuvara, N. “O scurtă istorie a românilor povestită celor tineri” (A short 
history of Romanians told to the young), p. 115, Humanitas, 2002
5 This territory was named Basarabia in the Russian Empire. In the Medieval Ages this was the name 
of the southern part of Moldova. Djuvara, N. “O scurtă istorie a românilor povestită celor tineri” (A short 
history of Romanians told to the young), p. 149, Humanitas, 2002
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Russians and Ottomans could not admit all this changes and, for the first time, 
they agreed to enter together the Romanian country – Russians in the northern part 
and Turks in the south. The revolution was put down in autumn of 1848 and the 
country was divided in two. Even Bucharest was cut in two parts, the way Berlin was 
after the Second World War (Djuvara, N., 2002). It was the end of the revolution, but 
not of the ideals that encouraged it! (Boia, L., 2002) During their exile to Paris and 
London, the Romanian leaders of the revolution undertook a very efficient and 
consequent lobby in favour of the unification of Principalities. Thus, in 1854, France 
(Napoleon III), Britain (Queen Victoria), Piedmont (the base of the future Italian 
Kingdom) attacked Russians on their territory, in Crimea, in coalition with Turks. Nor 
Moldovans, nor Muntenias (of Ţara Românească – n. a.) did accept the annexation 
of Basarabia in 1812. The boyars and intellectuals from Moldova and Ţara 
Românească reacted painfully at the denationalisation and Russification policy of 
Romanian basarabians.6 Being decided to take advantages out of the international 
conjuncture after the Crimea was (1853-1856) in order to regain the annexed territory 
in 1812, the leaders of the National movement from the Principality of Moldova and 
Ţara Românească addresses dozens of memos to the Big Powers, asking their 
support for the Unification of the two principalities under foreign rule in order to 
obstruct Russian influence in Southern part of the Danube River by returning to 
Moldova the territory between Prut and Nistru Rivers. Lord John Russell, former 
British prime minister and Foreign Affairs minister has sustained this proposal.7
However, it was impossible to achieve this goal due to the fact that in the view of 
Napoleon III Austrian Empire, and not Russia, was France’s main enemy. He chose 
to support Russian in order to gain their neutrality in case of an eventual war with 
Austrians. As a result of the Congress of Peace in Paris (1856), Russian Emperor 
lost its protector status and the south of Basarabia was given back to Moldova8, in 
order to prevent Russian access to the sea (not for the sake of Moldova’s 
reintegration!) Moreover, Moldova’s territory between Prut and Nistru Rivers, 
Basarabia, which was annexed in 1812 by Russians, continued to be incorporated 
into the Empire.
                                              
6 Hitchins, K., “The Romanians. 1774-1866”, Oxford University Press, p. 349, 1996
7 Schroeder, P. W., “Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War. The destruction of the European 
Concert”, London, Ithaca, p. 203-204, 338, 360, 1972
8 Under these circumstances, Russia returned just a small part of Basarabia, namely districts of 
Bolgrad, Cahul and Ismail. Vvernon John Puryear, “England, Russia and the Straits Question 1844-
1856”, California, Barkeley, p. 415-4331831  
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The big European powers, France and Britain especially, allowed a certain 
degree of unification of Ţara Românească and Moldova, but as United Principalities
and not Romania, as it was required. Also, each principality had to have its own ruler, 
government, parliament and army. These conditions were not negotiable, but 
obviously, they did not satisfy the expectations of the Romanian leaders, which found 
a simple and genius solution: on 5 January 1859 the elective assembly of Moldova, 
in Iaşi, voted for colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza and, a little bit later, on 24 January, in 
Bucharest the same person was elected ruler of Romanian country. The convention 
of Paris did not say that the same person could not be the ruler of both principalities! 
Three years later, a single government was established in Bucharest that, starting 
that moment, became the capital of the newly declared Romania.
Meanwhile, the annexed part of Moldova in 1812 was following its own way –
the Russian one. The region had between 240.000 and 350.000 inhabitants, the 
majority of which were Romanians and spoke Romanian. Total surface of the 
attached territory was around 45 630 km, 7400 more than what it was left to the rest 
of Principality of Moldova in 1812 (King, Ch., 2002). In the first decade of its 
annexation, Basarabia had the highest degree of autonomy given to a province in the 
whole Russian Empire9. In February 1828, two months before the eruption of the 
Russian-Turkish war, Tsar Nicolas I ordered the liquidation of Basarabia’s autonomy. 
Starting this moment, the denationalisation and Russification policy towards 
Romanian basarabians considerably increased, Basarabia being transformed 
gradually into a normal Russian province.10
In the light of the Russian state centralisation and because of the highly 
corrupted and greedy local nobility, Basarabia’s autonomy was diminished and a 
process of denationalisation of the local elites emerged. Soon, petty Jewish 
bourgeois11 and Russian bureaucrats formed the urban elite, while peasants were 
mostly of Romanian origins. The suppression of the use of Romanian language in 
schools and public affairs after 1822 was another imperial measure that aimed the 
                                              
9 Until 1817, the province was exempted from the payment of certain taxes. Romanian language was 
used along the Russian language in administration and justice, while in tribunals Romanian was the 
favourite one. The old administration and local legislation remained valid until 1918 when Tsar 
Alexander signed the status that confirmed the federal relation between Basarabia and Russian 
Empire. Livezeanu, I. “Cultură şi naţionalism în România Mare. 1918-1930” (Culture and nationalism 
in Great Romania. 1918-1930), p. 117, Humanitas, 1998
10 Jewsbury, G. F., “The Russian Annexation of Bassarabia: A Study of Imperial Expansion. 1774-
1828”, Columbia University Press, New York, 1976
11 Over 50.000 Jews were living in Chişinău in 1897, accounting for half of the population; almost all 
factories in the town were in Jews’ hands and, by the end of the century, sixteen Jewish schools were 
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instalment of Russian authority over Romanians in Basarabia. In 1867, there was not 
a single Romanian school in the region. However this did not affect the identity of a 
large part of Moldovan/Romanian peasants, since a vast majority of them was 
illiterate. In 1897, 15,6% of the whole population of Basarabia could read (Livezeanu, 
I., 2002). The same thing could not be said about the local elite, which was extremely 
Russified, because of its education in imperial universities, such as Odessa, Kiev, 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. The linguistic and cultural Russification of Basarabian 
elite and the predominant indifference among peasants made the spread of 
nationalistic feelings impossible here. Thus, Basarabia stayed outside the movement 
of pan-Romanian unification that sprang out in Romania after the unification of 1859. 
The first signs of national awakening and liberation were remarked with the occasion 
of the Russian revolution in 1905, but it was followed shortly by a reaction and it was 
severely limited. During the First World War the pan-Romanian nationalism was 
totally imported in Basarabia from Romania and Transylvania12, while Basarabians 
were fully caught in the social Revolution of 1917 (Livezeanu, I., 2002). 
The threat of the annexation by the new independent Ukraine and the fear of the 
inclusion in the civil Russian war, determined a congress of soldiers held in Chişinău 
to call for the autonomy of Basarabia within the Russian state. Later on, a temporary 
government, Sfatul Ţării, proclaimed the Democratic Moldovan Republic on 2 
December 1917. In order to stop the Bolshevik expansion to the region, Sfatul Ţării 
asked the help of the Romanian army. On 24 January 1918, soon after the arrival of 
the Romanian troops, the independency of the Moldovan Republic was declared. On 
9 April, Sfatul Ţării voted for the maintenance of a semi autonomy and conditional 
unification with Romania. In May 1918 Romania signed the peace with Central 
Powers that foresaw the return of Basarabia and its unification with its mother 
country, while the Central Powers acquired the total economic control over 
Romania13. The unification process has completed on 27 November 1918, when 
Sfatul Ţării cancelled its previous conditions and auto dissolved. 
                                                                                                                                              
operating in Chişinău. King, Ch., “Moldovenii. România, Rusia şi politica culturală” (The Moldovans. 
Romania, Russia and cultural policy), p.23, Arc, 2002  
12 Onisifor Ghibu, a Transylvanian writer and teacher, came to discover that it was less a problem of 
awakening of a lost identity, but more an attempt to build a new identity starting from zero. King, Ch., 
“Moldovenii. România, Rusia şi politica culturală” (The Moldovans. Romania, Russia and cultural 
policy), p.31, Arc, 2002  
13 The territorial acquisition of Basarabia is the only acquisition of Romania Kingdom that was never 
guaranteed by an international treaty. King, Ch., “Moldovenii. România, Rusia şi politica culturală” 
(The Moldovans. Romania, Russia and cultural policy), p.37, Arc, 2002    
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The big part of Basarabia’s population has welcomed the Unification with 
Romania. As a result of the agrarian reform, peasants were given land. A real 
revolution in education occurred. In a short period of time - twenty-two yeas –
hundreds of thousands of young and old Basarabians had the possibility to learn. 
Before the Unification, the percentage of those who could not read was very high and 
accounted around ninety per cent, compared to seventy per cent of Germans and 
fifty per cent in the case of Russians from Basarabia. By the end of 1930s,over fifty 
percent of Romanian basarabians knew how to read. In contrast to the Tsarist 
Basarabia, the studies now were done in Romanian language, i.e. the mother tongue 
of the majority of population was used. 
There were some categories of population that had a hostile attitude towards 
the Romanian administration. These animosities were nourished by the rigidity of the 
rulers in respect to those who infringed the public order. Such an attitude was also 
determined by the subversive actions undertook in Basarabia by the special agents 
of the Soviet Russia’s secret police and Comintern. 
The Soviet Union never accepted the loss of Basarabia and it was always 
seeking ways to hinder the integration of Basarabians into Romanian Kingdom. In 
this respect, an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Moldovan Republic (ASSMR) was 
created on the eastern border of Great Romania in October 1924. Although it was 
named Moldovan, the majority of the ASSMR population was of Ukrainian origins14. 
The creation of ASSMR was a deliberate step, since it represented a tool for Soviet 
Unions’ political pressure on Bucharest when negotiating Basarabia’s status. ASSMR
was conceived as a tool for the export of revolution in Romania and Balkans. This 
Soviet imminence did not have anything in common with the national and ethnic 
nature of the republic. Romanians formed an ethnic minority, the majority being of 
Ukrainian origins. Hence, it is obvious that it was an artificial title. 
Despite the normalization of the relationship between Bucharest and Moscow in 
1930s, no agreement regarding the status of the disputed province was signed. 
Moreover, as a consequence of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact of 23 
August 1939, Basarabia was annexed by the Soviet Union on 28 June 1940. Already 
on 2 August 1940, the Soviet Socialist Moldovan Republic was established, more or 
less on the historic territory of Basarabia. Measures were immediately taken to create 
a separate Moldavian nation, different from Romania, given the danger that a new 
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Romanian government could claim the annexed territory back on ethnic grounds. An 
„artificial“ dialect was introduced between Moldavian and Romanian, based on 
archaic Romanian and imported Russian vocabulary, written in Cyrillic script. 
Linguistic assimilation was a step on the way to ethnic assimilation - if you spoke a 
language as mother tongue you were likely to regard yourself as belonging to the 
nation associated with that language (Ben Fowkes, 1997). Also, Stalin proceeded 
with a policy of annihilation of the Romanian identity through mass deportations to 
Siberia of the „nation’s enemies“ - priests, teachers, kulaks - all of them forming the 
intelligentsia of the Moldovan Soviet republic15. Having destroyed the Romanian 
intellectual elites in Basarabia, the leadership of the Soviet Union replaced them with 
Russian speakers brought in from other republics - a new socialist intelligentsia, 
obedient to the Kremlin. 
It is not surprisingly, thus, that by 1991, when Moldova became independent 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it could not count on a clear national identity, 
given its multi-ethnic population and a fifty year-period in which all the aspects of 
Romanian identity were suppressed. Also, in the light of the complicated history of 
the region and its constant falsification, as an important way for the Soviet authorities 
to control the consciousness of the non-Russian nationalities of the periphery, it is 
not hard to understand why history is still a disputable ground and constitutes a 
constant feature of both the foreign and domestic politics of the Republic of Moldova.  
                                                                                                                                              
14 49% of the population were Ukrainians, while only one third of the population were Moldovans. King, 
Ch., “Moldovenii. România, Rusia şi politica culturală” (The Moldovans. Romania, Russia and cultural 
policy), p.52, Arc, 2002  
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CHAPTER II. THE EASTERN VECTOR OF MOLDOVA’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Russian Federation - The Big Brother
On 27 August 1991, after the failed coup in Moscow, the “sovereign, 
independent, democratic and free”16  Republic of Moldova was proclaimed. The 
population of the new state comprised 4 335 733 people, of which two-thirds (64, 3%) 
are Moldovans of Romanian descent and Romanian speakers. Due to Stalinization, 
Moldova has a massive non-Romanian minority of 35, 7% - the largest groups being 
Ukrainian (584 196, 13,8%) and Russian (540 900, 13%).17
Romania was the first country that recognised Moldova’s independence one 
hour after its proclamation, being followed by Georgia on the same day. However, 
the process of fully-fledged international recognition was rather difficult: the Occident 
powers were willing to acknowledge Moldova’s independence only after a Moscow 
decision in this respect.18 A period of confusion emerged up until the end of 1991, 
when the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist as a result of the 
creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 21 December 1991 at 
the Alma-Ata conference.19 Moscow accepted to establish diplomatic relations with 
the independent state Moldova, only after its promise to adhere to the CIS programs 
                                                                                                                                              
15  According to the archive data, the victims of the three waives of deportations and political 
repressions in Basarabia accounts to 885 000. BBC World Service, Romanian Section, 13 June 2001
16 Declaration of Independence, 1991 
17 Census of 1989, Vasile Nedelciuc, Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, The Parliament of the Republic 
of Moldova, 1992  
18 Iurie Leancă, Former First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, interview with the author, Chişinău, 3 
July 2002 
19 Baltic States did not take up the invitation by the Russian Federation to join CIS, as “they do not 
wish to form part of a post-Soviet Russian led community, which could constrain their freedom to form 
their own foreign-policy orientation.” Conflict Studies Research Centre, “Russia and the Near Abroad”, 
Dr M. A. Smith, March 1997 
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and policies. The recognition by the Occident powers followed shortly: Moldova 
became a member of the United Nations Organization on 1st March 1992. 
Since its first hours of independence, Moldova was dependent on Russia, 
because of powerful political factors (an influential minority, politically and 
economically active)20 21, cultural elements (the dominant role played by the Russian 
language and culture in the Soviet Union and afterwards) 22 , economic links 
(import/export trade and dependency on gas and electricity imports from Russia)23
and military reasons (the illegal presence of Russian troops on Moldova’s territory 
since 1992 until this moment),24 which still keep Moldova deep in the Russian sphere 
of influence. All these factors were largely used by Moscow diplomacy that declared 
the relationship with former soviet space a priority of Russia’s foreign affairs, 
including its relations with Moldova. This was later on stressed in the “Near Abroad” 
concept that implied, on one hand, a practice of different principles and rules in 
respect to former Soviet republics, and, on the other hand, it was a signal for the rest 
of the power centres that this region was an exclusive sphere of Russian influence.25
The Moldovan-Russian Treaty of Partnership was another delicate and hard 
issue of the relationship between the two states. The first official relations were 
established long before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, on 22 September 1990 
in Moscow, with the conclusion of the Treaty regarding the interstate relations 
between the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova and the Soviet Socialist Federative 
Republic of Russia. This document had a positive influence over the process of 
Moldova’s sovereignty consolidation. However, Russian Federation did not honour its 
engagement to ratify the Treaty, as did the Moldovan part eight days after the treaty’s 
                                              
20 Although numerically the Russian minority is only on the second place in Moldova, members of this 
community posed most challenges to the Moldovan authorities after independence...having organized 
the movement “Interfront” at the end of 80’s, which advocated for the preservation of the Soviet Union 
and special social status. “The EU & Moldova”, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2004 
21 The issue of the Russian community (a minority of 13% in Moldova) is important as it forms a card 
to be played by Moscow to remind Moldova that Russia is sensitive to the direction of its foreign policy 
orientation. Conflict Studies Research Centre, “Russia and the Near Abroad”, Dr M. A. Smith, March 
1997
22 Nowadays Russian is by far the dominant language in the Moldovan media…the superior power of 
attraction by the media from Russia, beefed up with stronger financial muscle as opposed to Romania, 
makes competition between the two languages a fairly unequal one. “The EU & Moldova”, Federal 
Trust for Education and Research, 2004 
23 Since Vladimir Putin came to power as the president of the Russian Federation, energy dependence 
and trade ties became two important factors of Russia’s relations with the former soviet states, 
including Moldova. Conflict Studies Research Centre, “Russian Foreign Policy 2000: The Near 
Abroad”, Dr M. A. Smith, December 2000
24Russian First Vice-Minister, Veaceslav Trubnikov, declared during his visit to Chişinău that the 
withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions would be possible only after the settling of the Transnistria 
conflict. 26 November, 2002, www.azi.md
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conclusion.26 Five years later, in Alma-Ata, an Additional Protocol to the treaty was 
signed up, in order to bring the document up to date and ease its implementation. In 
contrast to the first document that was appreciated as favourable to Moldova, the 
later was considered a regrettable mistake of the leadership in Chişinău, since it 
stated that, if necessary, the both parts would help each other in repelling aggression 
against one or both parts. Being compared to the Soviet-Finish Treaty of 1949, this 
article offered to Russia a perfect legitimate frame for further political interference in 
Moldova’s domestic politics. Fortunately, the Russian Parliament did not ratify this 
Additional Protocol, as well. Given this, but moreover, because of the dangers carried 
out by the protocol, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova pledged for the 
negotiation of a new Treaty and abandon of the old text. This way, in 1998 talks over 
a new treaty were launched. Relatively quickly the experts came up with a balanced 
text that did reflect the interest of both parts. However, the anticipated parliamentary 
elections convoked in Moldova just before the conclusion of the treaty (February 
2001), have brought significant changes in the political life, once with the 
overwhelming victory of Communists’ Party. Being obedient to the Kremlin, the new 
leadership in Chişinău had accepted Moscow’s new claims, i.e. to include in the 
preamble of the treaty references to Russia’s quality of guarantor-state in the process 
of the political settlement of Transnistrian conflict. Thus, this new element introduced 
in the last minute of negotiations, created an unbalanced situation, since the same 
roles, as guarantors, of the OSCE and Ukraine have not been confirmed in 
documents that would carry the same political and judicial weight as the Treaty does. 
Moreover, since there is no single document regarding the notion of the “guarantor-
state”, its prerogatives and the time limits for its activities, a feeling of uncertainty and 
insecurity will hover over Moldova’s foreign policy, both in the medium and long term. 
Also, the treaty, which has been harshly criticized by the opposition27, defines as 
strategic and privileged the relationship between Russia and Moldova.      
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the territory between Prut and Nistru 
Rivers found itself in a new geopolitical situation over the last 300 centuries – Russia 
                                                                                                                                              
25  Iurie Leancă, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy”, Transition: Retrospectives and Perspectives, Chişinău, 2002 
26 During 1990-1999 Russia refused to ratify the treaty because the document did not reflect the 
interests of the secessionist region of Transnistria and those of the Russian minority from Moldova. 
BBC World Service, Romanian Section, www.bbc.co.uk/romanian, 19 November 2001 
27 According to the opposition, the treaty has in view Moldova’s unlimited anchorage in the Russia’s 
sphere of influence. BBC World Service, Romanian Section, www.bbc.co.uk/romanian, 19 November 
2001
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was no longer its big bordering neighbour. However, it will take a long time until the 
both parts will treat each other as equal partners and get over the stereotypes of the 
past and characteristic complexes of their previous status - a complex of superiority 
in Russia’s case, due to its imperial existence and a central position in the Soviet 
Union, and an inferiority complex in Moldova’s condition, that was for more than 100 
years a province of the Russian Empire and, later on (1940-1991), a periphery 
republic of the Soviet Union. Moreover, as the history of Empires revealed, the 
former centres of power tried to maintain their dominant positions, but through other 
means, more subtle and sophisticated, but which still make possible the influence 
and even interference in the affairs of former dependants. This scenario was 
operated, to a large extent, by the Russian Federation in Moldova after its 
independence. 
Commonwealth of Independent State: Russia as the hub, the rest as the spokes
On 8 December 1991, the Republics of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine concluded 
in Minsk the Convention of Creation of the CIS and put an end, this way, to the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics as a subject of the international law and a geopolitical 
block. The Republic of Moldova adhered to the CIS on 21 December when its first 
president, Mircea Snegur, signed the Additional Protocol to the Convention at Alma-
Ata with the further mention that Moldova would not be part of the political-military 
component, because of its status of neutrality.28
According to the Status of the CIS29, the Community is not a State and does not 
posses supranational prerogatives30, but it aims at interstate integration. It recognizes 
the sovereignty of all its members, which are independent subjects, equal in rights 
before the international law, as well as their right to self-determination, their state 
frontiers and territorial integrity, and the renunciation to the illegal seizure of 
territories. The community does not allow the reciprocal interference into domestic 
and foreign affairs of any member state and pledges for peaceful solutions in case of 
                                              
28 Moldova will refuse to create any political union within the CIS and will only plead for economic 
cooperation, because the broken ties between economic entities have repercussions on people's living 
level and this would make the situation unstable. President Mircea Snegur, BASA-press, 
www.basa.md, 19 February 1994 
29 International Treaties a part of which is the Republic of Moldova, p. 241, vol. 16, Moldpres, Official 
Monitor of the Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, 1999  
30 Nevertheless, article 25, chapter VI of the Agreement of Economic Union, states: “If the present 
Treaty institutes different norms and rules to the national legislation, the rules and the norms of the 
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disputes among its members. However, the member states have the right to engage 
in “measures that aim the suppression of a danger that might occur in respect to the 
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of a member state of the commonwealth.” 
Article 12, section III of the CIS Status asserts that, if necessary, a common use of 
the Army Forces might be put into action, in regard to the self and collective defence. 
The CIS looks mainly for political, economic, cultural, judicial, humanitarian and 
health cooperation. Among its common activities account the coordination of the 
foreign affairs of the member states, financial-crediting policies, and the creation and 
development of a common informational zone, and economic and custom area, i.e. 
free movement of persons, goods, services, capital and labour. Another field in which 
the CIS seeks harmonisation is the body law. Article 20, section III, states: ”member 
states will cooperate in the aria of law, especially by completing multilateral and 
bilateral treaties of judicial assistantship, and will bring closer their national 
legislation.” The energetic component is also of big importance. This is why, the 
Electro-Energetic Council of the CIS has been established in order to organize stable 
supply of energy to the consumers in the member states. 
The Council of the Head States is the supreme body of the commonwealth, but 
the Council of Head of Governments also functions. The Councils have the right to 
adopt decisions regarding “the main important problems on the domestic and 
external levels, if necessary.” Moreover, the Councils coordinate the foreign affairs 
activities of the member states, including their actions in international organisations. 
The official languages of the Councils are the state languages of the member states, 
however, Russian is the working language. Each state can declare its inadvertence 
towards a certain problem, but this will not obstruct the adoption of a decision. Each 
member state has the right to denounce the Commonwealth Agreement or some of 
its parts, by notifying the holder of the Status (the Archive of the government of 
Belarus) one year before.  
The Agreement of Creation of the CIS entered into force in the Republic of 
Moldova on 8 April 1994. The pro-Romanian and pro-European opposition protested 
vehemently against Moldova’s entrance into the CIS. The Democratic Party affirmed 
that "Russia will use the economy to enslave Moldova politically” and that “as long as 
the occupational 14th Army stays in Moldova (Transnistria – n. a.), we can make no 
alliance with Russia." In the opinion of Christian-Democrat deputies, ”the CIS 
                                                                                                                                              
present Treaty shall be applied.” Thus, a supra-national prerogative has been attributed to a structure 
of the CIS.  
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Agreement includes not only economic aspects, but also political ones. Moldova 
would only suffer if any subordination to Russia is legalised by agreements or 
treaties.” According to a joint Declaration of the opposition parties, “the “voluntary” 
link of Moldova with the new Russian Empire, will badly influence our society; it would 
mean the legalization of the occupations of 1812, 1940 and 1944” and that “all 
international talks on Moldova will be made through Moscow." In addition, the 
opposition claimed that "the CIS membership does not solve economic and energy 
problems the CIS countries are facing, including Moldova”. 31  As BASA-press 
reported on 3 August 1993, around 200 people protested in the front of the 
Parliament against Moldova's CIS membership, shouting slogans like: "The 
Parliament wants us to have an economic, political, social and cultural Gulag!“ Even 
people from the president’s surrounding, such as the state advisors, Ştefan Gorda 
and Vlad Darie, forwarded their demands for dismissal, protesting, this way, to 
Moldova’s accession to the CIS that “would totally distort the image of Moldova as 
independent state", as Ştefan Gorda put it. 
There were mainly two internal factors that determined Moldova’s membership 
in the CIS: first, the supposed guarantee that the community will prevent Moldova’s 
swallowing by one of its neighbours, i.e. Romania; second, the role played by the 
very influential pro-CIS Russian minority, along with the nostalgic Russophile national 
minorities.32 Also, president Mircea Snegur thought that the accession to the CIS 
would fasten the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, through commonwealth and 
Russian pressure. Snegur was sustained by the conservative Democratic Agrarian 
Party and radical left wing, i.e. the Socialist Party and "Unitate-Edinstvo" Movement 
(Interfront).33 For the leader of the agrarians, Dumitru Moţpan, the economic crisis 
that hit Moldova soon after independence was the result of the collapse of trade links 
with the countries of the former Soviet space and loss of traditional markets for 
Moldovan goods. On these grounds, his party was pledging for the “necessity of 
adherence to the CIS” (Enache, 2000). The second president of Moldova, a former 
secretary for ideology in the Soviet Union, Petru Lucinschi, was another fervent 
proponent of the CIS. During his mandate, he actively promoted the idea of a Free-
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32 Enache, M., Cimpoeşu D., “Diplomatic mission to the Republic of Moldova. 1993-1997”, p.217, Polirom, Iaşi, 2000 
33 "We opposed the destruction of the USSR and we are still convinced that we were right. Since the 
USSR restoration is not possible, the former Soviet republics should reunite at least in a 
confederation. We see no other alternative: Moldova should be part of a political-military union 
comprising other CIS states". Vladimir Solonari, leader of the "Unitate-Edinstvo" movement, BASA-
press, www.basa.md, 03 August 1994 
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Trade Zone on the territory of the commonwealth, as a way to increase Moldovan 
exports. He also continued the line of “compatibility” between Moldova’s integration 
into the CIS structures and European integration. "No one in the EU told me that we 
should leave the CIS if we want to get closer to Europe”, declared Petru Lucinschi on 
several occasions to the media. However, nobody supported so vociferous and 
loyally the engagement to the CIS, as did Vladimir Voronin, who became the third 
president of Moldova in April 2001 in a uniquely among the CIS’s countries position: 
he is an active Communist and he combines the position of head of the state with 
that of First-Secretary of the party, in accordance with the Soviet model. His foreign 
policy was a continuation of the previous one, that of all azimuths. As Voronin put it 
when he came to power, Moldova will be present where its national interests lie, 
especially in Russia and the CIS.34
The communist leadership in Chişinău is seen as an expression of Moscow’s 
interests in Moldova. The Russian government and president Vladimir Putin 
personally have repeatedly blessed Moldova’s Soviet-nostalgic authorities as 
“democratic” (despite criticism of “democratic deficit” from the Council of Europe and 
the European Union), encouraged it to reorient rapidly Moldova’s economy towards 
the CIS and urge it to embark on cultural and linguistic re-Russification. The reward 
for Communists‘ loyalty came when Vladimir Putin awarded to Vladimir Voronin the 
honour of hosting the CIS summit of 2002, although Moldova was not in line to hold 
the reunion, since it had done it in 1998, while other member states have never 
hosted a CIS summit yet. Moreover, according to a Russian analyst on the CIS 
matters, “Voronin’s voice is being heard loudly, out of proportion to Moldova’s weight 
and significance within the CIS. Today it is said that Voronin ranks second only to the 
Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, among the friends of the Chairman of the 
Council of Heads of State, Vladimir Putin.”35
However, almost a decade after Moldova’s accession to the CIS entered into 
force, one can say that Moldova’s stake on the Commonwealth as a solution to its 
ardent problems (Transnistria conflict, energy dependence, economic crisis) was 
wrongful. As president Petru Lucinschi told media, “everybody knows that the internal 
working mechanism of the CIS is not efficient”. Many of the integration agreements 
signed by CIS members have not been implemented. According to Dr M. A. Smith, 
about one agreement in twenty is being implemented out of a total of about 1300 
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agreements. Therefore, although integration exists as a process in the CIS, it cannot 
be compared to the smoother and more effective integration processes taking place 
in the European Union.36 Assessing the activities of the CIS for year 1997, Russian 
President, Boris Yeltin, recognized that “the danger of the CIS disintegration 
emerged” as some of its members prepared their withdrawal (Flux, 21 January 
1998). Next year, opening the CIS summit in Kremlin, he stated rightly so that “the 
Commonwealth proved itself unable to develop on a new interstate basis” and that a 
new structure had to be established (Flux, 02 April 1999). 
Discussions emerged again about the need to reform the organisation and 
transform it into a more effective integration structure with an emphasis on the 
economic integration. The activities within the Economic Council were declared a 
priority and an executive committee was created - all this in an attempt to bring the 
CIS organisational structure closer to the European Union one. However, this was 
regarded as a difficult task in the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which aimed 
the reform of the CIS into “a regional fully-fledged social-economic organisation”.37
Despite hundreds of documents, treaties and summits, various unannounced excises 
and taxes were introduced; restrictions to alcohol imports were instituted and 
warnings of gas and electricity cuts became frequently. In addition, the provisions of 
the Custom Union and Free-Trade agreement are not being implemented until 
present.38
For Moldova, the only palpable result of its membership into CIS is probably the 
ninety-nine Byelorussian tractors brought to Chişinău in March 2002 when, on this 
occasion, President Vladimir Voronin stated that “this is the result of Moldova’s 
integration into CIS”, especially that Moldova will have to pay two thousand less 
dollars per tractor, i.e. eight thousand dollars. The payment will be done in corn-
seeds for the agricultural needs of Byelorussia, according to president Voronin. Other 
“results” of Moldova’s membership into CIS are hard to be found. 
Conceived as a formula of “civilised divorce” between the former Soviet 
republics, the Commonwealth offers today more reasons for disappointments rather 
than spectacular benefits. The CIS has not come up with solutions for the severe 
problems that the post-Soviet countries are facing at the moment. (One hundred 
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36 Conflict Studies Research Centre, “Russia and the Near Abroad”, Dr M. A. Smith, March 1997
37 Diplomaticeskii Vestnik, MID Rossiiskoi Federatii, No. 5, May, 1999 
38 All this affected the trade stability between the CIS states. Enache, M., Cimpoeşu D., “Diplomatic 
mission to the Republic of Moldova. 1993-1997”, p.218, Polirom, Iaşi, 2000 
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millions of inhabitants of the CIS and the European part of the former Soviet Union 
live bellow the poverty line, according to a UNDP report released in 1999. A more 
recent UNDP report, published on 9 July 2003, revealed that Moldova is the poorest 
country not only of Europe, but also within the CIS). The community is strongly 
variegated, not just because there are twelve currencies or ten types of frontier-guard 
uniforms from Chişinău to Kamciatka, but also mainly because its members are very 
different in terms of political rule (liberal societies versus totalitarian regimes) and 
economies (free-market orientated economies versus the centralised ones). 
“A suitcase without ear”39 - “it is hard to carry it, but sorrowful to abandon it” is 
by far the most adequate description of what the commonwealth is about at the 
present. The community is rather a Presidential Club, than a viable international 
structure and this club continues to display inertia, simply because no one has the 
courage to declare CIS a useless body that has to be brought to an end.40 There are 
no mechanisms of coercion or penalization and, paradoxically, the CIS does not even 
mediate the conflicts within its territory, such as Nagorno-Karabah or Transnistria. 
Moreover, as Radio Free Europe put it, the CIS is not recognized as a subject of 
international law and no country or international organisation maintains relations with 
it, as such. The contradictions and constant disputes among the member states have 
led to the establishment of affiliated bodies of the CIS, like the Economic Euro Asiatic 
Council (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) or the newly 
agreed Economic Union between Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, since it 
became clear that a Free-Trade Zone across the CIS is impossible to establish. But 
these are also structures without essence, since Russia is seeking influence not 
through multilateral organizations, but through bilateral relations. The CIS seems to 
limit to “attempts of synchronization” rather than deepening integration, and is more 
important for the opportunity that it gives to solve issues of bilateral matters at 
bilateral meetings. 
The CIS was created in 1991 without a clear political vision in medium to long 
run. Its goal in short term was to maintain the republics in Russia’s sphere of 
influence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Also, Russia attempted to 
regain the influence it has lost in the countries of the Eastern Europe by dominating 
the CIS countries and persuading the world that the CIS and Russia are the same 
                                              
39 This is how the CIS has been perceived so far, President Vladimir Voronin, BBC World Service, 
Romanian Section, www.bbc.co.uk/romanian, 07 October 2002
40 The decisions of this club and the reality are like two different planets whose orbits never interact. 
Dmitri Ciubasenco, “A suitcase without ear”, www.azi.md, 14 October 2002  
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thing. CIS played an important role in the formulation and implementation of Russian 
policy towards the former Soviet republics (except three Baltic States).41 As Dr M. A. 
Smith put it, integration has become the key notion of Russian policy towards its 
partners in the CIS, which aims the creation of a community of states that is closely 
tied to Moscow. The Russian Federation can fairly be regarded as the core of this 
integration process, as it is a process that is taking place largely on the basis of 
Russian interests.42 The Putin leadership argued that a stronger CIS integration firstly 
required the creation of a common law space (similar to the body law of the EU), 
followed by the development of the Custom Union. But there is awareness that 
Russia lacks the mechanisms and policy instruments in order to bring a closely 
integrated CIS united around a Russian core. In this respect, the recent demands of 
the Foreign Ministry in Moscow to declare Russian the official language in all CIS 
countries43, might be seen as that sort of mechanism that Russia wants to secure in 
order to preserve its influence in the region. 
Nevertheless, it seems that Russia does not need anymore an official 
confirmation of its status of the CIS leader, as well as it does not want to continue 
being the “nurse” of its small brothers.44 “This fact has tied up Russia’s hands, 
compelling it to sacrifice its own interests for the sake of the unity of the CIS. Now 
that Russia is moving towards the European political and economic space, the long 
caravan of the CIS might become an essential burden”,45 as Itoghi newspaper put it 
in October 2002. This is probably the main reason for Vladimir Putin to resign the 
position of Chairman of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS and hand it over to 
the Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma. Thus, for the first time since the creation of 
the CIS, another country besides Russia took over the control of the organisation in 
2003. Furthermore, the Russian government has sent official notifications to the 
governments of the CIS member states to quit a number of treaties and agreements 
signed within the commonwealth on general principles of tax policy, on customs 
policy principles, on regulation of social and labour relations in trans-national 
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the Foreign Minister, Yevgenny Primakov. “Russia seeks a new place in the world”, Izvestia, 6 March 
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42 Conflict Studies Research Centre, “Russia and the Near Abroad”, Dr M. A. Smith, March 1997
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corporations working on the CIS territory, and Convention on trans-national 
corporations. 
Russian and foreign experts are saying that Moscow has begun a conscientious 
dismantling of the Commonwealth of the Independent States in order to prevent its 
chaotic disintegration. Also, they are arguing that the inevitability of the CIS’s break-
up became obvious after Russian President, Vladimir Putin, handed the CIS 
presidency over to Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma, and after the creation of 
new economic blocs that mark the onset of a real integration in the former Soviet 
area. Thus, leaders of the CIS member states might soon agree with the proverb that 
they have been using so far as a joke about the Commonwealth summits: “The one 
who does not regret the collapse of the USSR has no heart; the one who wants its 
restoration has no brains.” (BBC, 2002) 
Transnistria- the “black hole” of Europe 
Two major problems have marked dramatically the independent state Republic 
of Moldova since its birth – the separatist conflict on the territory between the Nistru 
River and Moldova’s eastern frontier with Ukraine, known as Transnistria (“over 
Nistru”) and the illegal presence of Russian troops and munitions. In late 1980s, the 
nationalist movement in Moldova faced vehement opposition of the other ethnic 
groups, especially of the Găgăuz community and Russian ethnics. The widespread 
anti-Russian sentiments (primarily directed to the Russian political elite and not to the 
population) and calls for re-unification with Romania have nourished a “reactive 
nationalism” among the Russian speakers, which started to organise counter 
demonstrations and strikes. Protests from the Russian and Ukrainian minorities 
sprang out in the capital city, Chişinău, and in Bălţi, the second largest city situated in 
the northern part of Moldova. But the main important movement became the Union of 
Workers Collectives, created on 11 August 1989 out of several Workers Collectives 
from Transnistria (ICG Europe Report, 2003). 
On 2nd September 1990 the “Nistrian Moldovan Socialist Soviet Republic” was 
proclaimed as part of the Soviet Union. In August 1991, a group of Russian-born 
citizens of the Russian Federation that mainly held ranks in Russia’s military and 
security services have successfully seized power in Transnistrian region in the 
putsch of the old guard, which aimed to preserve the USSR. Shortly after Moldova’s 
declaration of independence, on 2nd September 1991, the Supreme Soviet of 
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Transnistria adopted its own constitution as part of its policy of step-by-step 
secession from Moldova. On 1st December, Igor Smirnov was elected the “president” 
of the self-proclaimed republic, whose “independence” was approved on the same 
day through a referendum. The leader of the separatists consolidated his power the 
next year thanks to the intervention of the 14th Russian Army. During the winter of 
1991/1992 and especially after Moldova’s accession to the United Nations on 2nd
March 1992, separatist paramilitary forces attacked several Moldovan police stations 
in Transnistria and tried to overthrow Moldovan authorities from rural areas loyal to 
the government in Chişinău. Smirnov’s group gave a strong support to the industrial 
centres of the region, which were directly subordinated to Moscow and feared any 
transfer to the Moldovan government, and was supported, in turn, by them. 
Furthermore, the management of the industrial sector rejected any plans of 
Moldova’s independence, since its identification was entirely with the Soviet Union. 
As the International Crisis Group put it, this factor resulted in “a combination of 
interests and identity symbols that were diametrically opposed to those among 
Moldovan-speaking communists and pro-Romanian nationalists alike.”46
In spring 1992 violence escalated into a total war that lasted for couple of 
months and in which almost two thousand people were killed (BBC, 16 July 2003). It 
was the intervention of the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, which put an end to the 
fighting in summer of that year when he signed together with the Moldovan president, 
Mircea Snegur, a Convention in this respect. In 1994 Russia and Moldova concluded 
an agreement concerning the complete withdrawal of the Russian troops. Yet, the 
agreement never came into force, since it was not ratified by the Russian Lower 
Chamber of the Parliament, which decided to examine the "inadmissibility of 
withdrawing the 14th Army from Transnistria" (BASA-press, 10 April 1995). The 14th
Army was by far the strongest military factor in Moldova, numbering about 9, 250 
troops with heavy equipment whose deployment was subject to limitations set by the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: 126 battle tanks, 198 armoured 
combat vehicles and 127 artillery pieces.47 By 1999, the number of 14th Army troops 
had been reduced to 2, 600, but its presence, even if less significant in military terms, 
is still securing Transnistria’s de facto independence and Russia’s indirect influence 
over Moldovan leadership. 
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At the OSCE summit in Istanbul in late 1999, Russia accepted formal deadlines 
for the destruction or withdrawal of its equipment by the end of 2001, and total troop 
and stockpiled munitions’ (40,000 tones) withdrawal by the end of 2002. Although 
Russia respected its engagements in regard to the first deadline (due to heavy 
diplomatic pressure and promises of considerable financial support), it missed the 
second one because of the so-called “technical” obstacles, i.e. the opposition of 
separatist regime in Tiraspol that obstructed the roads with the help of the famous 
ostensible group “Women of Transnistria” (activities coordinated with Russian 
leadership, according to observers). At its year-end ministerial meeting held in 
Portugal in December 2002, the OSCE extended the deadline for the withdrawal of 
remaining troops and ammunitions to the end of 2003, but potentially for a longer 
period, given the introduction, on Russia’s insistence, of the clause that the 
withdrawal should be conducted “provided the necessary conditions are in place”, 
although the 1999 Istanbul agreement had mentioned no conditions. Also, the OSCE 
new document only acknowledged Russia’s “intention” to withdraw the troops, not its 
“obligation” any longer. Moreover, the head of the OSCE mission to Chişinău, William 
Hill, have already admitted that the withdrawal of Russian equipment before the end 
of this year is unachievable, because of the opposition of Smirnov’s administration.48
He avoided saying whether the deadline for the withdrawal will be extended or 
sanctions will be operated against Russia, and he also did not mention a word about 
the withdrawal of Russian troops, a fact that made observers in Chişinău speak of a 
Moscow tactic that aims to keep Russian troops in place as “peacekeeper” forces. In 
this respect, according to Radio Free Europe,49 hundreds of Russian soldiers have 
been transferred already to the Transnistrian armed forces; thus, the troops who 
were supposed to leave Moldova will remain here under a different name.    
The OSCE has come under severe criticism in the last year both in Moldova and 
outside for “being subordinated to Russia”, as Taras Kuzio, former chairman of 
NATO Information Office in Kiev, put it.50 This “subordination” is displayed not only 
through a new extension of the deadline for the withdrawal of Russian troops and 
equipment from Moldova, but also through the support that the OSCE is giving to the 
Russian proposal to federalize the Republic of Moldova, as a solution to the conflict 
in Transnistria.
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On 3rd July 2002, a draft agreement proposing to turn Moldova into a federation 
was made public in Kiev during the five-sided negotiations’ format, i.e. between 
Moldova, Transnistria (as parts in conflict), and Russia, the OSCE and Ukraine (as 
mediators). The draft was initially submitted by the OSCE, but, as it was revealed 
later on, Russia was the main author of the agreement (BBC, July 2002). According 
to the Kiev document, the three guarantors would supervise the internal working of 
the federation, its constitution, legislation and the functioning of its institutions. The 
proposal was powerfully criticized by the opposition and the civil society in Moldova, 
and by various international analysts and organizations. Over fifty percent of 
Moldovans qualified the idea of federalization as unacceptable, according to an 
opinion poll published by the Institute of Development and Social Initiative “Viitorul” in 
2003, and almost forty percent said the federalization would lead to the disintegration 
of Moldova as a state. As George Soros was among the first to remark, this 
mechanism (federalised Moldova -n. a.) would, in effect, become a Russian 
protectorate.51 According to Wall Street Journal Europe, the arrangement would hand 
Moscow a permanent lever of influence on “federalized” Moldova and would place it 
under the “guarantees” of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE – an arrangement that 
would ensure multiple Russian representation (in its own right, via OSCE, and via 
Kiev).52    
The West is largely excluded from the mediation and guarantee mechanism of 
the conflict’s settlement, its presence being limited to the OSCE role, in which, 
however, Russia has the right to veto. Romania was excluded from the mediation 
mechanism in 1992 largely because of Russia’s pressure, although its participation 
as Moldova’s neighbour was entirely justified. Yet, the five-sided format has proved 
unable to solve the conflict. The OSCE failed to identify the reasons that were at the 
basis of the dispute, but also that led to its freezing (Kuzio, T., 2003). Russia and 
Ukraine are themselves far from being democratic, the rule of law is constantly 
violated and the countries are ravaged by corruption. From this perspective, they are 
obviously unqualified to oversee the democratisation process in Moldova. This is why 
talks about the need to change the format of negotiations have intensified lately, 
while the European Union announced its intention to get more actively involved in the 
settlement of the conflict. The Greek Presidency of the EU sustained that Transnistria 
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51 http://www.basa.md
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should be the conflict of “Wider Europe” in which the EU should get involved. 
Furthermore, Chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Cooperation Committee EU-
Moldova, Jan Marinus Wiersma, claimed that the EU could directly participate in a 
peacekeeping operation in Transnistria. 
Unsurprisingly, Russian Federation and the OSCE and the communist 
leadership in Chişinău have opposed the EU proposal. For instance, Russian Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vyaceslav Trubnikov, and the head of the OSCE mission 
to Moldova, William Hill, have both stated that the current mechanism should be kept, 
while the Moldovan president, Vladimit Voronin, said that he would not accept military 
presence “just for the sake of it” (Flux, 30 July 2003), although later on he welcomed 
this proposal. In addition, the Russian representative in the Chişinău -Tiraspol 
negotiations, Aleksandr Yakovlenko, affirmed that “this initiative will complicate the 
difficult negotiation process” and added that “such statements have to be avoided in 
the future”.53 On contrary, Romania and Ukraine declared their support to the Dutch 
initiative in its capacity as EU member state and future OSCE president, which 
obviously had the agreement of Brussels. Through its involvement into the 
Transnistrian problem, by sending EU peacekeeping forces to eastern part of 
Moldova, the EU seeks to contribute to the stabilization of a region that constitutes 
Russia’s “near abroad”, subject to Russian droits de regard, but which in few years 
time, after Romania’s probable accession in 2007, will become its direct neighbour. 
Thus, Moldova is no longer to be viewed as Russia’s “near abroad” since it now 
forms the enlarging Europe’s immediate neighbour.  
Although Russians are the third-largest population group in Transnistria (25%), 
behind Moldovans (40%) and Ukrainians (28%), it is mostly them who rule the region. 
The authorities are mainly Russian; the top leaders are mostly Russians from Russia 
(as distinct from local Russians) and the Russian population is concentrated in the 
city of Tiraspol (“capital” of the self-proclaimed Moldovan Nistrian Republic). 
Moldovans and Ukrainians are living predominantly in the rural area, still toiling in the 
Soviet style collective farms - kolkhozes - are underrepresented politically and an 
object of Soviet-style linguistic Russification by the authorities.54 No one denies that 
separatist regime is surviving due to massive profits out of contraband, various types 
of illegal traffic, arms sales and thanks to a repressive police regime and a big 
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security apparatus. In addition, free gas from Russia ($800 million’s worth in officially 
acknowledged gas debts) keeps the group in power (Socor, V., 2003).  
Notwithstanding, the frozen conflict in Transnistria is more accountable to a 
painless resolution than any of the Balkan or post-Soviet conflicts. It has not led to 
mass displacement of population and it has not seen any fighting since 1992. Also, it 
is neither religious, nor interethnic in its nature (though it does have ethnic 
implications).55 Nevertheless, a rush to solve the problem as quick as possible by 
federalizing Moldova will not be a settlement, but a defeat.56 Federalization would 
empower the citizens and agents of a foreign country, i.e. Russia, which openly 
profess loyalty to it. Power sharing with the criminal regime of Igor Smirnov in a 
federation would pull fix Moldova into Russia’s orbit for an unlimited period of time, 
since the separatist leadership – actually Moscow via Tiraspol – would have a strong 
word to say on Moldova’s internal and external affairs. 
Ukraine – a “wait and see” position
After the collapse of the Soviet colossus, Chişinău and Kiev have tried to 
establish a friendly framework for further development of bilateral relations. 
Moldova’s diplomacy bear in mind Ukraine’s capacity to play an important role in 
maintaining the stability in the region, the common perception of dangers and threats 
against their states and the similarity of political and economical problems faced by 
both in the process of independence affirmation.57
Since its first hours of independence, Ukraine has started to establish judicial-
political relations with its neighbours, including Moldova, on the basis of frontier 
inviolability with an irreversible character. Kiev diplomacy was successful in achieving 
rapidly its goals in respect to its relations with Chişinău – on 23 October 1992 the 
Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between 
the both parts. Yet, Ukrainian authorities were not so fast with its ratification. On 
contrary, it conditioned its validation with the finalization of the state-frontier 
delimitation, a delicate to be problem of the Moldovan-Ukrainian relations. In 1997, 
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Moldova’s leadership agreed to lease 7,7 kilometre of strategic Odessa-Reni 
highway in the region of Palanca village for a period of ninety-nine years in exchange 
for the Ukrainian 100 metre strip of Danube bank in the region of Giurgiuleşti village. 
The negotiations were seriously harmed, after the Ukrainian frontier-guards moved 
theirs posts 100 metres into Moldova’s territory along the Danube River in March 
1998. This small territory is of big importance to Moldova that intends to build with the 
financial support of the EBRD an oil petroleum terminal on Danube River where it 
possesses almost 1 kilometre of bank. The terminal will have an annual capacity of 
two million tones of raw petrol. At the moment, Moldova pays eighty dollars per a 
tone of petrol imported from Russian through Ukraine. The import of petrol through 
Danube would reduce the costs to fifty dollars per tone. Besides, the terminal would 
offer the possibility for petrol imports from Orient (Enache, 2000). Finally, the sides 
have agreed to the exchange of territories - a deal that was qualified as “treason” by 
some opposition parties.58 However, in the final text of the Agreement of Frontier 
Delimitation (signed in Kiev on 26 august 1999) the provision regarding the period of 
ninety-nine years was not included (Ukrainian side did not present any relevant 
reasons in this respect) and the 7,7 kilometre stretch of strategic Odessa-Reni 
highway became property of Ukraine. 
Ukraine is one of the biggest trade partners of the Republic of Moldova. 
According to official data, in the first half of year 2003 Ukraine was the leading 
exporter country, its delivered goods accounting for almost one hundred thirty million 
dollars per year. Although the Ukrainian minority is the biggest one in Moldova 
(13,8%), it was the least active in re-acquiring its national identity after the collapse of 
the USSR, party because is the community that was most assimilated during the 
Soviet times, but also because it did not have a compact existence, as did the 
Găgăuz (Christian Turks) and Bulgarians ethnics situated in the southern part of 
Moldova. Thus, the Ukrainian minority did not pose to the central authorities in 
Chişinău the kind of challenges that Russian ethnics did, and this issue did not 
become a problem that sought a solution at the interstate level. 
As in the case of Moldovan-Russian relationship, the Moldovan-Ukrainian one 
was influenced substantially by the Transnistrian conflict. Kiev’s leadership had a 
downright position in respect to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova, 
which was expressed consistently in the front of the international community, to a 
large extent because Ukraine was facing the same problem in its southern part 
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(Crimea) and it did not want the presence of Russian troops at its western frontier as 
well. However, as far as the process of political settlement of Transnistrian conflict 
was concerned, Ukraine had a controversial and unsteady stance. In the first years of 
the conflict, because of its separatist movements in Crimea, Ukraine had a very weak 
position and accepted totally the scenario imposed by Moscow authorities in dealing 
with the breakaway region of Transnistria, which gave a tacit support to separatists in 
Tiraspol. By the mid 1990s, once the stability came to Crimea and to Ukrainian-
Russian relationship, Kiev started to promote a more active and independent policy 
in regard to the crisis in Transnistria. This way, in late 1990s it was not hard to notice 
incisiveness in Ukraine’s position that came up with its own scenario of political 
settlement of the crisis in the eastern part of Moldova - Poetapnoie razresenie 
conflicta (“step-by step” solution of the conflict). De facto, that meant a gradual 
recognition of the separatist administration without a guarantee that a compromise 
would be reached. 
  Furthermore, each time Chişinău moved closer to Moscow, Kiev started to 
support separatist leaders. Also, the position of the administration in Tiraspol got 
closer to Kiev, every single time the Ukrainian authorities proposed a solution to the 
dispute. Tensions also appeared because of Kiev’s refusal to establish joint control 
along its border with Moldova’s territory that is controlled by separatist authorities. 
This hostile position went against the statements of the Ukrainian authorities 
regarding their availability to contribute to the resolution of the Transnistrian crisis. 
Also, it confirmed Ukraine’s unwillingness to seal of its borders to stop contraband 
because too many Ukrainians make money here.
This is why, from the perspective of Ukraine’s biased involvement in the 
Transnistrian conflict, which does not follow the line of the Chişinău leadership and 
encourages the fulfilment of geo-politic interests of Moscow, I would classify Ukraine 
as a factor that represents and maintains, to some extent, the eastern orientation of 
the foreign affairs of the Republic of Moldova, despite Ukraine’s positive role of 
balancing Russia’s influence in the region.  Ukraine could become the opposite, if it 
would support through effective means the Europeanisation of the settlement 
process in the breakaway region of Moldova. Also, pledging in favour of European 
Union and NATO membership and moving closer to these organizations, Ukraine 
could become the driving force in Moldova’s efforts to join the European community. 
However, there is a long and uneasy way to go in order to get to this point, since both 
countries are facing severe political crisis on the domestic scene and are still 
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economically and politically dependent on Russia, a factor that hinders their 
European aspirations. 
CHAPTER III. MOLDOVA AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: LOOKING 
WESTWARDS? 
Romania and Moldova – the two Romanian states 
After the annexation of the Romanian territory between the Prut and Nistru 
Rivers to the Soviet Union in 1940, Prut became not just a fluid demarcation line 
between the two parts, but also a frontier that had to block the access of any 
Romanian element to the newly created Soviet Moldovan Republic. In the light of late 
‘80s reforms that Moscow embraced, i.e. perestroika, glasnost and acceleration, and 
after the overthrow of Ceauşescu dictatorship in Romania, measures were taken to 
bring Moldova closer to Romania. 
Romania was the first country to recognize internationally the independence of 
Moldova, only few hours after its proclamation on 27 August 1991. At that time, 
independence was seen as the first step in Moldova’s return to its mother country 
(BBC, 2001). A concept of “the two Romanian states” originated in Bucharest, but the 
leadership in Chişinău, which acknowledged the common shared history, language 
and culture, also accepted it. Thus, the framework for a privileged relationship, based 
on political, economic and cultural integration, as well as support and mutual help at 
the international level, was set up. Moreover, the relations between Moldova and 
Romania had to develop in line with their similar aspirations on their road “back to 
Europe” and their wish to reunite within the Euro-Atlantic organizations. Moldova 
figured in all Romanian strategic programs and programs of regional and sub-
regional cooperation. Dozens of agreements and conventions regarding cooperation 
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in various fields were signed and special funds of the Romanian Government were 
allocated to Moldova, such as thousand scholarships for students. However, the 
opportunity for “privileged” relationship was not turned to the best account because of 
the policy of rejecting all Romanian factors, which emerged soon after Moldova’s 
independence within the neo-communist agrarian group of the first parliament and 
which was vociferously applied after agrarians came to power in 1994. 
The Moldovan stream as opposed to Romanian tendency started to gain 
grounds in Chişinău. The concept of „two Romanian states” was rejected and the 
anthem „Deşteaptă-te Române” (Romanian, awake!) was replaced with ”Limba 
Noastră” (Our Language) that, ironically, was written by a prominent Romanian 
poet.59 Article 13 of the new Constitution of the Republic of Moldova adopted in 1994 
proclaimed “Moldovan”, not Romanian, the official language of the country. Thus, the 
Soviet policy of Moldovenism as opposed to Romanian, which was initiated in 1924 
with the creation of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Moldova Republic (ASSMR) on the 
eastern border of Great Romania, was resumed. The ASSMR had in view the 
invention of a distinct Moldovan identity and, ultimately, a separate Moldovan nation 
(King, Ch., 2002). So, the agrarian government made a decisive step towards 
Moldova’s detachment from Romania. 
Although ”the importance of multilateral cooperation with Romania” was 
underlined at the official level in Chişinău and the Concept of Foreign Policy of 1995 
stated that „a special attention is given to the cooperation with Romania in order to 
overcome Moldova’s economic unilateral dependence and to integrate it into the 
European community”, in reality, the dialogue between the two states was scarcely 
structured and coherent both on the political and economic levels.60 In 1996, Petru 
Lucinschi, a politician that had close links to Moscow, was elected president of 
Moldova. He replaced the “privileged” character of Moldovan-Romanian relationship 
with the so-called “pragmatic” one. Petru Lucinshi also rejected the concept of “the 
two Romanian states” (BBC, 2001). 
After the parliamentary elections in 1998, a democratic and pro-reforms
parliamentary coalition was formed out of centre-right wing parties. As a result, the 
                                              
59 President Snegur called "unfounded" President Iliescu's unionist hopes, while Moldovan deputy 
speaker Andronic said that "the statements made by the Romanian officials on the possible 
reunification of Moldova with Romania might stimulate to greater activity the advocates of Moldova's 
adherence to the CIS collective security system, which might lead to the deployment of collective 
troops at the border with Romania", BASA-press, Chişinău, 24 October 1994 
60  Iurie Leancă, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy”, Transition: Retrospectives and Perspectives, Chişinău, 2002  
36
foreign policy saw considerable changes, i.e. the European Integration was declared 
a priority of Moldova’s foreign affairs, while the relations with Bucharest were 
qualified as essential and indispensable to Moldova’s European aspirations. The 
dialogue between the head of states, prime ministers and ministers was given an 
impulse to. Far-reaching economic projects were written down, whose enforcement 
would have not only positively influence the cooperation between Moldova and 
Romania, but also set down the necessary conditions for Moldova’s further 
multidimensional integration within South Eastern Europe.61 Yet, the main obstacle in 
the fulfilment of these projects was the lack of financial resources. Romania was part 
of PHARE program, while Moldova was included in the TACIS fund of the EU. 
Consequently, given the difficulties of interoperability among these funds, but also 
because of the bureaucracy in Brussels, the main goals of the above mentioned 
projects were not achieved. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that Romania 
made constant efforts in order to strengthen Moldova’s western orientation, mainly in 
the front of the international organizations. For example, Romanian diplomacy played 
an important role in respect to Moldova’s inclusion into the Initiative of Cooperation in 
South-Eastern Europe and the Stability Pact in the region. 
After the February 2001 early parliamentary elections that saw an overwhelming 
return of the Communists’ Party to power,62 the relationship with Romania reached its 
most difficult period. The communist president, Vladimir Voronin, said he wants to 
create “modern socialism” by aiming closer ties with Russia. He has described 
Moldova as a “European Cuba” that must hold out against “imperialists predators” in 
Europe, as Cuba had in the America.63 Simultaneously, the communist leadership 
initiated an aggressive policy towards Romania, accusing it of expansionism and 
direct interference in Moldova’s internal affairs, during an enquiry at the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in the case of the Metropolitan Church of 
Basarabia, subordinated to the Romanian Orthodox Church. Ironically, communists 
were the one to recognize and legitimise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, 
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after a final decision of the ECHR at the end of the year 2001.64 As a reply, the 
Romanian prime minister cancelled his visit to Chişinău stressing that it was 
impossible for the bilateral relations to be maintained until the accusations were 
cleared out. However, the communists went even further by announcing plans to 
make Russian an official language and compulsory in schools, like in the Soviet 
times, and to replace “The History of Romanians” with “The History of Moldova”, 
which enhanced the Soviet Stalin-style concept of Moldovenism. Months of anti-
communist protests sparked at the beginning of 2002, which ended only when the 
communists formally gave up to their plans, under the pressure of the Council of 
Europe.65 Meanwhile, the Romanian leadership adopted a strategy that sought to put 
an end to the diplomatic tensions between Bucharest and Chişinău, by focusing on 
the economic cooperation and support for Moldova’s European integration. Also, the 
Romanian authorities announced their intention not to sign the Political Treaty with 
Moldova because “it would not bring anything special and new from the perspective 
of Romania’s position towards Moldova”, according to the Romanian prime minister, 
Adrian Năstase.66 In the words of local and outside observers, this refusal signals a 
pragmatic and non-ideological attitude of Romania towards Moldova, especially since 
the treaty would not bring current or future benefits to both sides. Also, it is 
considered that Romania had a tacit approval of the EU in this respect. 
By conceiving the relationship Bucharest - Chişinău as a component of the 
Moscow-Chişinău relationship, the communist leadership proves that it continues to 
be captured by an ideological approach in its rapports with Romania. Moreover, in 
Moscow is still largely spread the idea that Russia and Romania are engaged in a 
competition for influence in Moldova. As V. Socor put it, “the judgement according to 
which a normalization in the Bucharest-Moscow relationship would form a reason for 
further involvement of Bucharest in Moldovan domestic affairs is totally wrongful and 
represents a legacy of the past that has no base in the present times” (Flux, 2003). 
Hence, the relationship between the two Romanian states was characterized by a 
bizarre sinuous development, as a consequence of the “identity crisis” of Moldovan 
authorities and the suspicion they treated with Bucharest’s policies (with some 
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exceptions). On the other hand, Romanian did not posses, unlike Russia Federation, 
the necessary financial and economic potential in order to support the Republic of 
Moldova in overcoming the political and economic problems that it has been facing 
since its first hours of independence. 
The Council of Europe - Monitoring Moldova  
The Republic of Moldova became the first CIS country to join the Council of 
Europe (CoE) in 1995. The admission was more than acceptance it the European 
democratic family, it actually represented further recognition on the international level 
of Moldova’s independence and a consolidation of its statehood. Moldova’s 
admittance occurred in the light of Council of Europe recommendations and, 
respectively, some commitments by the first regarding the post-accession fulfilment 
of the criteria required for membership. Subsequently, these commitments were and 
still are subject to monitoring by the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. Two 
problems were a hallmark that characterized Moldova-CoE relationship: the 
recognition and legalization of the Metropolitan Church of Basarabia, and the case of 
the political prisoners in Transnistrian jails - both subjects of trials at the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
The issue of Metropolitan Church of Basarabia is a political and, to some extent, 
a foreign one. The Church, subordinated canonically to the Romanian Orthodox 
Church, was liquidated after Moldova’s annexation to the Soviet Union and a 
Metropolitan Church canonically dependent on the Russian Patriarchy was 
established. The authorities of the independent Republic of Moldova recognized 
immediately the Russian Church and refused permanently the authorization of the 
Romanian one. Thus, a Patriarchy whose history is closely linked to the history of the 
Greater-Russian expansionism and which has been a tool in the service of this 
expansionism was given a central role on the spiritual and identity formation in 
Moldova. So, Moscow’s power and leverage was highly maintained in the former 
Soviet republic with the direct approval and protection of the local leadership, which 
feared that Moldova would turn towards Romanian cultural realm, if the legalization of 
the Metropolitan Church of Basarabia were to be afforded. Notwithstanding, 
Moldovan authorities had to admit to legality the Romanian Church after a final 
decision of the ECHR in late 2001. 
The problem of the political prisoners is still not solved and far from settlement.  
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Ilie Ilaşcu, Alexandru Leşco, Tudor Petrov-Popa and Andrei Invanţoc were arrested 
in 1992 under accusations of terrorism. Ilie Ilaşcu has been sentenced to death, but, 
as a result of the pressure of international community, he was sentenced to life 
prison. The other persons were sentenced to twelve and fifteen years of prison. The 
separatist leader, Igor Smirnov, has conditioned their early release with requests of 
forgiveness in this respect. Alexandru Leşco, Tudor Petrov-Popa and Andrei Invanţoc 
have refused to sign this kind of letters because they do not recognize the regime 
that has condemned them. In 1999, the solicitors of the " Ilaşcu group” accused 
Russia Federation and the Republic of Moldova of violation of numerous articles of 
the European Convention of Human Rights at the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg. ECHR will take a decision on this matter by the end of this year. 
The worsening of the political and social situation after the Party of Communists 
came to power in 2001 and the emergence of a serious political crisis in Chişinău 
have led to a real climax between Moldova, as member of the CoE, and Council of 
Europe, as such, when an intention to initiate a special procedure aimed at excluding 
Moldova from chairing the Committee of Ministers was expressed. The intention was
eventually dropped, however, the very fact of its existence revealed the seriousness 
of the existing democracy side slipping in the Republic of Moldova.     
European Union and Moldova: a missed opportunity?  
The dialogue between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union 
developed sporadically, incoherently and with an inadequate dynamic in the first 
years of Moldova’s existence as a state (Leancă, 2002). The lack of a clear 
European orientation in Chişinău’s foreign policy towards Brussels has determined a 
strategy of the EU that placed Moldova in the same geo-political context with the 
former Soviet republics, except and unlike Baltic States that were immediately 
engaged in their journey “back to Europe”. Moreover, Moldova was put in the same 
basket with Mongolia as far as the technical assistance of the EU was regarded. 
Moldova has been offered by the EU a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 
1995 (enacted only in 1998!) that defined the relations between the two.67 In spite of 
all advantages the country could have as a result of the PCA implementation, this 
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document did not provide for a clear finality of Moldova’s relations with the EU, i.e. 
membership of the Union.    
The main important reason for this attitude laid down in Moldova’s failure to 
define the EU membership as strategic orientation and its member states as strategic 
partners, and its engagement in a multidimensional foreign policy of “balancing 
between East and West.” According to the 1995 Conception of Foreign Affairs, 
“taking into account the weight of the developed Occident states in the world 
economy and its roles in the system of international relations…the Republic of 
Moldova will pay special attention to the development of a relationship of partnership 
and cooperation in multiple fields with Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain.”68
Various internal and external factors influenced developments in Moldova after 
its independence. However few of them were crucial in determining its treatment by 
the EU members and its further place after the USSR collapsed. Moldova’s appeal to 
the most ardent supporters of Central-Eastern European countries (CEEC), such as 
Germany and Britain, remained weak and proved rather unpopular for Western 
investors and exporters, due to Moldova’s insignificance for Western economy (in 
comparison to the Visegrad and Baltic countries), lack of geographical proximity, 
modest progress and incoherence towards economic reforms and political instability, 
aggravated seriously after a civil war erupted in the breakaway region of Transnistria 
in 1992. 
For example, the geographical, historical and cultural proximity played an 
important role in the European integration efforts of the Baltic States since 
Scandinavian countries have ensured that they would be included in the Association 
process as soon and as deep as possible, with the Nordic pattern becoming a model 
for economic and political reforms. As a result, the three Baltic States became less 
dependent upon the Russian market, being drawn more seriously into linkages with 
Scandinavian economies. On contrary, Moldova’s pledge on the European level was 
considerably weakened by the lack of such a strong patron. Romania was not seen 
anymore as Moldova’s advocate, as the pro-independence Moldovan current as 
opposed to unification with Romania emerged in Chişinău. Moreover, Romania’s 
patrons – France and, to a lesser extent, Italy – opposed more generous 
concessions to the CEEC applicants because of domestic constraints and 
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scepticism. Thus, the questions of “patronage” stood in sharp contrast to the 
experiences of CEEC and Baltic States, whose association was powerfully supported 
by Germany and Scandinavian countries, and Moldova, which experienced a lack of 
effective advocacy given its insufficient credibility. 
Germany was the only EU member state to react relatively quickly to the 
appearance of the new state, the Republic of Moldova, by establishing a diplomatic 
mission in Chişinău in 1999. France was the second Western European country to 
open its Embassy in Moldova (yet this does not fully operate), being followed by the 
United Kingdom that sent its Ambassador to Chişinău in summer 2002.  
As the European integration became a priority for Moldovan leadership, which 
realised the need of an intensive and consistent dialog with the Western capitals, and 
Chişinău made explicit in 1999 its aim to join the EU, its relations with the Union 
member states took a positive turn. An insistent and animated Moldovan diplomacy 
started to pledge in Brussels and other European chief cities the place of the country 
in the European context: Chişinău was seeking, at least, Moldova’s location into the 
South-Eastern dimension of Europe. Also, a requirement of the further launch of 
accession negotiations between the EU and Moldova was made, since that would 
make the country eligible for the EU membership. In the same manner, the 
diplomacy of Chişinău has requested the launching of bargains aiming the conclusion 
of a Free Trade Agreement with the EU69 and has also asked for a more active 
involvement of the organization in the political settlement of the conflict in 
Transnistria.  
When the EU inaugurated the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SPSEE) 
in 1999, Moldovan government made important efforts for its inclusion into this new 
regional initiative, which was conceived as a regional anchor to the country (it was for 
the first time when the EU officially identified Moldova as a South-Eastern European 
country) and a placement into a new geo-politic and geo-economic context. 
Moldova’s main objective has been receiving a clear perspective of integration into 
the European Union offered by the Pact. Although running the risk of being attached 
the label of a Balkan country in the negative sense of this expression, Moldova’s 
diplomacy aimed to leave the CIS group of countries and gradually join the South-
East European group. However, this objective led only to a partial success. Formally, 
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the Republic of Moldova has been recognized as a South-East European state by the 
United States that accepted it as a full participant to the South East European 
Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and included Moldova in the US Action Plan for South 
East Europe.70
The authorities of the Republic of Moldova perceived the eventual exclusion of 
Moldova from the Stability Pact as an indefinite drive out from the configuration of a 
new democratic and prosperous Europe, especially in the light of Romania’s 
accession negotiations with the EU. As O. Ungureanu wrote, this fact could lead, 
inter alia, to the political and economic breakaway of the Republic of Moldova from 
the neighbouring countries of South-Eastern Europe and the whole European space; 
growth of the economic gap between Moldova and the countries of this area and 
difficulties in Moldova’s economic and trade relations with the countries of South-East 
Europe involved in the process of negotiations with the EU on the Stabilization and 
Association Agreements, and difficulties generated by restrictions imposed by the EU 
in the relationship with third countries.71
One of the visible results of Chişinău’s insistence was a more active 
involvement of the EU countries in the settling process of the Transnistrian crisis. For 
example, the Netherlands has proposed the EU to send its representative to the 
Primakov commission created in Moscow, according to a similar mechanism that has 
been used in Kosovo (the Ahtisaari-Cernomârdin commission). The implementation 
of this scheme would have comprised an unprecedented EU presence not just in the 
breakaway region, but also in Moldova’s affairs and, to a large extent, could have 
influenced its destiny. Yet, this proposal was not turn into practice. 
On the other hand, the bilateral relations between Moldova and various Western 
countries saw a positive turn. Germany was the most receptive to Moldova’s 
European aspirations, German diplomats being among the first in the EU to 
acknowledge Moldova’s potential to become part of the Eastwards enlargement of 
the Union. 72  During 1998-1999, Moldovan-French relationship has developed 
prodigiously. After the visit to Chişinău of the G7 leader, President Jaques Chirac, 
far-reaching economic and trade projects were outlined. Also, the dialogue with 
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Britain has animated and, after the visit of the deputy secretary for political affairs in 
May 2000 to Moldova, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office decided to open its 
Embassy in Chişinău and support its participation in the Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe. Further, after the Spanish group “Union Fenosa” has privatised the 
central and southern electricity supply of Moldova, a chance to give an impulse to the 
relations with Madrid has appeared. 
The early parliamentary elections in February 2001 saw a massive return of the 
Communists’ Party to power. The electoral foreign policy of the Party foresaw a 
development of relations on all azimuths, especially with the CIS group of countries, 
and an eventual accession to the Russia-Belarus Union. Yet, after the results of the 
elections were announced, the new president of Moldova, the first-secretary of the
Communists’ Party, Vladimir Voronin, claimed that the foreign policy will not envisage 
essential changes and that it would be characterised by pragmatism and realism. 
The immediate actions of the new leadership came to confirm these statements: the 
Republic of Moldova acceded to the World Trade Organization (despite the 
opposition of the Communist Members of the Parliament) and Moldova became a 
member of the SPSEE. But these were actually the results of the activities 
undertaken by the previous two governments (of Ion Sturza and Dumitru Braghiş 
prime-ministers), and not achievements of the new communist leadership (Leancă, 
2002).   
However, new accents occurred in Moldova’s foreign policy, once with the 
dismissal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.73 Under the title of “strategic partnership” 
with Russia Federation, Moldova moved towards a unilateral policy, embracing the 
Eastern orientation of its foreign affairs. For instance, from April 2001 until summer 
2002, president Voronin met Russian president, Vladimir Putin nine times (a record in 
this respect). Step-by-step, Chişinău abandoned the concept of “economic security”, 
which pledged for a diversification of exports and energetic resources, and Russian 
investors and capital entered rapidly Moldovan economy and trade. 
The European integration objective was limited exclusively to a state of 
declarations and a lack of concrete actions aiming to bring Moldova closer to the EU, 
such as the harmonization of national legislation and the creation of state institutions 
responsible for Moldova’s integration within the EU, could be easily noticed. Also, the 
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dialog with the European Commission and European capitals became sporadic, while 
sightings of Moldovan politicians and diplomats in European capital cities became an 
increasingly rare occurrence.
The membership of the Stability Pact did not bring the anticipated political and 
economic benefits, because of the inability (and lack of wish) of the communist 
leadership to give more substance and coherence to this regional initiative. The crisis 
that occurred in the Moldovan-Romanian relationship, after the Communists accused 
Romania of expansionism, has determined the inefficiency of Moldova’s membership 
in the Stability Pact. The regional projects were the main important dimension of the
SPSEE, so an excellent cooperation with Romania was needed in order to obtain 
political and financial support within the Pact. Since that was not the case, Moldova 
soon found itself behind the other members of the initiative and was not treated 
anymore in the South -Eastern geopolitical context by Brussels. 
Furthermore, the communist government started a policy of intimidation and 
discrimination against the biggest EU investor, the Spanish group “Union Fenosa”, 
announcing that the agreement of privatisation signed up with the previous 
government was illegal, for instance. This has led to difficulties and problems in 
Moldova’s recent relations with the EU and financial international organizations, 
namely the World Bank. 
In March 2003 the European Commission presented to the European 
Parliament a document with the title “Wider Europe”, 74  which set out a new 
framework for relations over the coming decade with its future neighbours that do not 
currently have the perspective of EU membership, but who will soon find themselves 
sharing direct border with the Union, including Moldova. The Commission refused to 
say whether any of these countries could become members of the EU and it offered 
the “ring of friends” participation in all EU policies, but not in its institutions. However, 
it suggested that all neighbourhood countries should be offered the prospect of a 
Free Trade Agreement, provided that concrete progress and effective implementation 
of political, economic and institutional reforms on “shared values” take place. 
Although the element of differentiation was underlined, the same document deals 
with the eastern and southern border regions, which creates the impression that 
Moldova was not only put in the same basket with Ukraine and Belarus, but also with 
countries like Morocco – a fact that led to a reaction of disappointment in Chişinău, 
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since it was a sign of essential diminution of Moldova’s chances for the membership 
of the Union. This was soon confirmed by the spokesman for external relations of the 
EU, Diego de Oyeda, who claimed that Moldova’s accession to the EU is not taken 
into consideration by the Union. “We don’t know if Moldova’s inclusion into the EU 
will ever be an option. Time will show. All we can offer at this moment is the 
advantage to participate in the common European market”, he added in an interview 
with Radio Free Europe.75  
Meanwhile, the communist authorities intensify their European rhetoric, by 
requesting the type of asymmetric trade preferences already granted to the Western 
Balkans countries and asking the Commission to open a delegation office in 
Moldova76. In this respect, the chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Cooperation 
Committee EU-Moldova, Jan Marinus Wiersma, has announced the availability of the 
European Parliament to establish the EU Embassy in Chişinău. Also, President 
Voronin claimed in a meeting with Commissions’ president, Romano Prodi, that 
Moldova will adopt a concept of European Integration of the country and will create a 
department to deal exclusively with this matter. Recently, the communist leader 
stated that “the European road” is the optimal choice for Moldova’s development and 
the strategic document of the country, “more important than any other party 
programs”.77
However, the gap between the pro-European statements and actions of 
Moldovan authorities is too large, a fact that questions the frankness of these 
declarations. According to V. Socor, “the nullification of an administrative-territorial 
system that was implemented with the financial support of the Occident and which 
aimed the homogenisation of the local public Moldovan authorities to the European 
one, and its replacement with a Soviet-type administrative reform is one of the proofs 
of Moldova’s moving off from Europe, not its appropriation to it” (Flux, April 2003). 
The communist authorities in Chişinău lacked political will to embrace the sort of 
reforms that it knew the EU is looking for, such as the liberalization of economy, 
safeguard of the judiciary autonomy, respect of the press freedom and human rights, 
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and the improvement of the investment environment.78 Yet, more important and 
serious was the incapacity of the administration in Moldova to fulfil the sort of reforms 
required. Besides, the Republic of Moldova has lacked the clarity of objectives in its 
pro-European course to secure a solid relationship with the EU in the long term. Its 
foreign policy was and still is rather ill defined: it seeks closer economic ties with 
Russia and CIS on the one hand and with the EU on the other. 
Given the need for drastic reforms and the necessity of pushing the local elites 
forward, more leverage is needed. As Jan Marinus Wiersma MEP argued, asking 
Moldova to implement Copenhagen criteria without being clear about the reward, will 
not work. 79  However, Moldova should be more insistent and should take real 
measures in order to increase its credibility in the eyes of the Union member states 
since the EU does not make generous gestures unless it has strong and convincing 
reasons. 
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CHAPTER IV. SIMULTANEOUS INTEGRATION IN THE CIS AND THE EU – A 
CONTRADICTION IN TERMS 
“The moment Moldova enters the EU it will have to say “Goodbye” to the CIS”, 
Jan Marinus Wiersma80
The previous chapters examined the Eastern vector of Moldova’s foreign affairs 
and presented the main important elements of its European orientation, as well as 
some historic considerations that outlined the clashes of European (Latin) and Slavic 
cultures on the present territory of the Republic of Moldova. This part of the paper will 
analyse how the both positions interacted and influenced each other in more than a 
decade of Moldova’s existence as independent state. 
As it was argued earlier, Russian Federation is at the core of the Eastern course 
of Moldovan foreign policy since there are powerful political, economic, cultural and 
military factors that keep Moldova in the Russian sphere of influence. The bilateral 
relationship is marked by Russian military presence on Moldova’s eastern part and 
Chişinău’s considerable economic81 and energetic dependency82, while a notable 
part of Moldova’s population still has a psychological attachment to Russia, in terms 
of memories of relative welfare experienced during Soviet times. Also, the multilateral 
cooperation of Moldova in the post-USSR space, i.e. the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, is dominated by Russia. Most of Moldova’s trade with the CIS is 
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actually trade with Russia. In 2000, 75 per cent of its exports to and 46 per cent of 
the imports from CIS countries were with Russia, which has also become the most 
important investor in Moldova. As C. Neukirch put it83, with the partial exception of 
neighbouring Ukraine (12, 9 per cent of Moldovan exports to CIS in 2000) and of 
Belarus (7,9 per cent) no other CIS country plays a noticeable role in Moldovan 
economics. From this perspective, it becomes clear that for Chişinău, the CIS is first 
of all a forum to balance relations with Russia in a multilateral setting.  
Russia has weighty leverage over Moldovan leaders largely due to the common 
shared Soviet past - a predominant feature of Chişinău’s domestic politics. The 
governing programmes of the first governments had no references to the integration 
into the European Union. The agrarian government of Andrei Sangheli (1994-1997) 
dedicated a single sentence to this matter, which was placed next to the CIS as far 
as the priorities of Moldovan foreign affairs were concerned. The next cabinet 
(Ciubuc I, 1997-1998) did not make any remarks regarding the EU, but it presented 
in detail the activities on widening and deepening of the country participation in the 
CIS. By contrasts, the program of Government Ciubuc II (1998-1999) contained a 
special section fully dedicated to the issue of European Integration. 
However, the European Integration as a strategic objective of Moldova’s foreign 
policy was set up only in 1998 by the cabinet of the young and reformist 
businessman, Ion Sturza – the only executive that took substantial measures in order 
to bring Moldova closer to the EU. Even the title of its programme, “Supremacy of the 
Law, Revival of Economy, European Integration”, acknowledged the crucial place of 
the European aspirations of Moldova. Related to the relations with the CIS group of 
countries, priorities were given to bilateral links between the member states of the 
Commonwealth. In addition, the relationship with Russian Federation was mentioned 
only in the context of Transnistrian conflict.84 Thus, the policy of all azimuths of the 
previous governments was declined and an explicit course was brought in. 
Nevertheless, the political orientation changed again after the dismissal in late 1999 
of Sturza cabinet (some of its members facing severe corruption allegations) and the 
establishment of the Braghiş Government, as a result of the alliance of Communist 
and Christian Democrat members of parliament. Consequently, the European Union 
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lost its strategic place, which was designated again to the CIS. The dedication of 
Moldovan authorities to the CIS has become even stronger after a Communist 
government came to power in early 2001. 
Moldovan authorities failed to define clearly Moldova’s foreign priorities after the 
proclamation of independence and continued to pursue a multi-vector policy. As the 
first president, Mircea Snegur, claimed in an interview to "Financial Times, “the 
signing of the CIS Agreement on the Economic Union by Moldova does not mean 
ceasing relations with Romania and Western countries. Moldova remains open for 
cooperation with all countries” (BASA press, October 1993). President Snegur was 
also among the first to argue that there was no contradiction between Moldova’s 
membership of the CIS and its European course – a thesis that was largely 
propagated by the second pro-Moscow president, Petru Lucinschi. For example, on 
different occasions he declared that Moldova’s participation in CIS policies does not 
run counter to its efforts of European Integration, since all the CIS members, 
including Russia, wish to integrate within the European system (Flux, January 2000) -
an affirmation that one can question since only Ukraine has announced its intention 
to submit its application for EU membership out of the whole CIS group of countries. 
This ambiguous position was present at different levels of Moldovan political 
leadership. In this respect, the prime minister, Dumitru Braghiş, told radio "Deutsche 
Welle" that Moldovans nor can declare that they are Europeans and want to be part 
of the EU, nor can they cease relations with the CIS (Flux, November 2000). 
Out of all political parties, only Christian Democrat People’s Party and Liberal 
Party have pledged for the reconsideration of Moldova’s membership in the CIS as a 
pre-condition to its Euro-Atlantic integration. According to Christian Democrats, “our 
memberships of the CIS, as well as the intention of our current government to 
integrate Moldova into the Russia-Belarus Union are insurmountable barriers in the 
way of our joining the EU”.85  The rest of centre-right wing political parties are 
favouring the European integration but, at the same time, are opting for maintaining 
Moldova’s relations with the CIS countries. As the program of the Social Democratic 
Alliance of Moldova states, “European Integration in no way contravenes or rule out 
the continuation and enhancement of relations between Moldova and the CIS states”. 
The Social Democratic Party  “in no way approves of moving our relations with the 
CIS partners in the background” and it is convinced that “the inefficiency of this 
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Community in relation to initial expectations is largely due to the passivity of 
members states and lack of initiative”.86 In May 2000, twenty out of twenty eight 
political parties and social-political movements adopted a declaration that proclaimed 
the European Integration “a fundamental strategic objective for the Republic of 
Moldova” (Flux, 10 May 2000). Christian Democrats also noted that the Parliament 
should denounce the Agreement regarding the creation of the CIS. Only centre-right 
wing parties signed the paper. 
On the left wing, movement “Ravnopravie” (Equality of Rights) requires the 
augmentation of economic and cultural links with the CIS member states, Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus counting among the first. The Party of Communists believes that 
in order to get closer to the EU it is enough to adjust the CIS standards to those of 
the EU. Simultaneously, communists speak about the accession to Russia-Belarus 
Union and the alignment to Russian interests, especially in the economic field. 
According to president Vladimir Voronin, “the European Integration remains the main 
important vector of Moldova’s foreign affairs, but that does not mean that Moldova 
will become the grave digger of the CIS” (BBC, July 2003). The Communist leader 
considers that the CIS should become a similar organization to the EU, based on the 
same principles and standards. His spokesman, Valeriu Reniţă, went further in an 
interview with the BBC, by saying that “there is no need for Moldova to choose 
between two different directions since it is impossible to cease the traditional and 
important economic relations with Russia”. This way, the Presidency replied to the 
statement of Chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Cooperation Committee EU-
Moldova, Jan Marinus Wiersma, according to whom, “Moldova’s presence in 
structures such as the CIS is incompatible with its future status of EU member state” 
and “the moment Moldova enters the EU it will have to say “Goodbye” to the CIS”.87
Previously, the External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, warned that closer 
European integration might be hampered by simultaneous attempts to develop 
integration among former Soviet republics: ”If we are seeing at one and the same 
time an attempt to develop regulatory convergence and legislative convergence 
within the Newly Independent States and an attempt to provide convergence with the 
EU's legislation and regulatory competence, it's a bit like trying to play three-
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dimensional chess. So that is a real complication and one should not ignore it” (BBC, 
9 July 2003). 
These statements were the first explicit signs of the EU addressed to Moldova 
regarding the incompatibility between the EU and CIS membership, thus, putting 
upside down the assumption in Moldovan ruling circles that simultaneous integration 
within the two organizations is perfectly normal. From this perspective, Moldova’s 
ambivalent foreign policy of balancing between eastern and western orientation will 
have to change at one point, if it wishes to become a credible partner in the front of 
the EU member states and EU as such. Accordingly, one can draw the conclusion 
that Moldova’s stance in regard to the suitability of its CIS membership and 
integration into the Union could not be and never had been considered appropriate in 
the Occident, especially given the huge gap between the statements and actions of 
Moldovan rulers. As the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) put it, the position of 
balancing between the CIS and the European Union, which in fact signifies the 
absence of any clear political “materially tangible” conception in promoting relations 
in the frame of both organizations, is becoming more inefficient and less 
convincing.88
At least a half of Moldova’s population is reluctant to determine its place in 
Europe, according to recent opinion pools. Over fifty-one per cent think that Moldova 
should become a member of the EU, while forty-three per cent favour the 
strengthening of the links with the CIS. Out of those who pledged European 
Integration, sixty six per cent are young people (aged between 18-29 years) and fifty-
eight per cent possess a university degree. Around fifty four per cent of those who 
want further integration within the former Soviet space are over sixty years old and a 
large majority (sixty per cent) has no university education (Flux, February 2001). 
According to the IPP Barometer of Public Opinion released in May 2003, opinion in 
support of the World Bank improved, while that of the CIS worsened.89 Hence, with 
the mobile sector of the population having mainly European aspirations and the 
oldest part still sharing Soviet nostalgia, the question of Moldova’s European 
integration becomes a marking line between the past and the future of the country. 
Moldova’s future prospects will be countless determined by the enlargement to 
the East of the EU and the shifts which will occur, as a result, in the EU-Russia 
Federation relationship, since it will bring the notion of “Europe” unprecedented 
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closer to Russia. Alongside Ukraine and Belarus, Moldova will create the new non-
EU “Europe”, which is replete with potential problems, from regime collapse to 
economic implosion, in addition to actual, ranging from organized crime, a frozen 
conflict in Moldova and endemic corruption.90 As Dr M. A. Smith writes, the EU is the 
leading trade partner of the Russia Federation, accounting for about thirty-five per 
cent of Russia’s trade turnover and the EU widening could increase this figure to fifty-
one. The economic importance of the EU for Russia is one reason why Russia 
emphasises her identity as a European power and sees the EU as potentially her 
main partner in the international arena.91
As early as February 1999, Russian president, Boris Yeltsin claimed that 
“Russia can not think of herself outside Europe” and that “a single Big Europe can 
not be created without Russia”.92 This discursive identity was further reinforced by 
the leadership of Vladimir Putin, according to whom “Russia is an indispensable part 
of Europe” that must evolve together with Europe, but not opposed to it as in the 
Cold-War period. President Putin even argued that the CIS group of countries should 
elaborate a joint programme of European integration. He also declared his 
determination to press ahead with the creation of an internal market including the 
European Union as well as the former Soviet republics: “We intend to work together 
on establishing a single economic area within a “Greater Europe” (BASA-press, 
October 2002). Nevertheless, Strategy of developing Russia-European Union 
relations in a medium run (2000-2010) stipulates that a further development of the 
Russian-EU partnership should strengthen Russia’s role as a leading force in the 
creation of a new system of international political and economic relations in the CIS 
space.93 Hence, the EU’s enlargement up to the borders of the former Soviet Union 
could increase Russian desire to establish a firmer sphere of influence in the CIS, 
after the Baltic States managed to escape the Big Brother’s embrace’ - an 
inadmissible defeat in Russia’s view. Moldova, with its frozen conflict that the EU 
wished to get involve into, could become a field of clashes of Russian and Occident 
interest, a fact that may have unpredictable consequences on Moldova’s state of 
affairs. 
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Moldova’s membership of the CIS is another key dimension of its Eastern 
vector, along with its bilateral relation with Russia and the role played by the later in 
the Transnistrian conflict. Yet, as far as the CIS prospective is concerned, it is crystal 
clear that its future lies exclusively in Russia’s hands. According to IPP, Russia will 
preserve its presence and control over the post-Soviet area with or without the CIS, 
namely through bilateral and sub-regional relations, the creation of the Euro-Asian 
Economic Union being a case in point. The fact that Russia announced its withdrawal 
from the main important programmes of the CIS might be a sign that Moscow, 
acknowledging the unviable character of the organization, 94  has initiated its 
dismantling in an attempt to find more efficient and practical ways of cooperation.  
The creation of the CIS was necessary and justified as far as it was a way to 
preserve the military, economic, political and informational influence of the former 
USSR in its former republics. Also, the CIS served as means to prevent violence 
escalation in the region. The goals of the Commonwealth’s founders to turn it into an 
integration mechanism did not become reality, the CIS facing currently gradual 
disintegration. Although the CIS is a large regional organization, the interest of 
foreign investors towards it has been considerably poor (IPP, 2002). Widespread 
corruption, political and economic instability and a hostile environment for foreign 
investors – these are just some of the hallmarks that characterize every member 
state of the commonwealth, a fact that had badly influenced Moldova’s image, to a 
certain extent. 
Having joined the CIS, Moldova has drastically limited its possibilities to 
participate in EU’s political and economic policies, as well as in its institutions. As a 
result, Moldova has been placed by the EU in the same basket with Ukraine and 
Belarus, and not with Baltic States to which so many Moldovans were akin when the 
independence was gained.  
When communism collapsed and the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, many 
leaders in Chişinău considered that Moldova and the Baltic States started on the 
same footing in their affirmation as independent states and inclusion into the 
European family. This was in the light of a common post-war history strengthened by 
passionate contacts between the Moldovan and Baltic Popular Fronts and their 
reciprocal support in fighting for independence. As T. Venclova wrote, “Moldovans 
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were regarded as allies in the common cause of liberation from the Russian yoke.”95
However, it has not worked out like that and Moldova lags far behind in its European 
integration, while the EU summit in Copenhagen in late 2002 confirmed that the 
Baltic States would form part of the first-wave of the EU enlargement in 2004. The 
reasons for this can be found in the clash of history and culture on the territories of 
these countries, but more importantly was their modern politics and diplomacy. 
On Moldova’s domestic level, the first thing that strikes an observer is the 
incompetence of an obsolete political class – few have proper qualifications and up-
to-date knowledge and experience, compared to Baltic politicians that enjoyed a 
qualified assistance of a very strong Diaspora and formed themselves as specialists 
outside their countries. Moreover, the political leaders who came to power in Moldova 
were and still are closely linked to Russia due to their past as Soviet bureaucrats.  
Unlike the Baltic States, Moldova could not resist the sort of Russian-inspired 
secessionist movements seen in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
More importantly, while the Baltic States went for a complete rupture with the past, 
Moldova signed up to the CIS programs, remaining thus a satellite of Moscow’s orbit.  
A feeling of frustration prevails in Chişinău given the fact that the European 
Union treats the Republic of Moldova in the light of its relations with Russia. Some 
views compare this attitude with Europe’s indifference to Moldova displayed before 
World War II. As O. Ungureanu put it, “when taking into consideration the fact that 
over ten years after the proclamation of independence Russian troops are still being 
stationed on Moldovan territory, while they have been already withdrawn from the 
territories of the Baltic countries a long time ago, it is hard to overthrow the allegation 
that Europe disregards the Republic of Moldova.”96
Does Moldova’s Eastern orientation inhibit its European aspirations? 
The short answer is “Yes”. 
Moldova’s Eastern orientation is anchored in many more and even more 
powerful factors compared to its Western vector. Moldova’s bilateral relations with 
Russia are much stronger than the ones with its neighboring countries – Ukraine and 
Romania, although with the later Moldova shares common history, language and 
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culture. Unlike Ukraine and Romania, the Russian Federation has a considerable 
impact on Chişinău’s domestic affairs thanks to its leverage on the political leaders 
and its crucial place in Moldovan economics. In addition, Russia is the indisputable 
leader of the settlement process in the Transnistrian crisis, while the European Union 
and the OSCE have failed to pursue the interests of the European community after 
the civil war erupted on the left bank of Nistru River in 1992. As a result, the 
presence of the 14th Russian Army on Moldova’s territory has severely undermined 
its independence, as it has constituted a tool for Russian direct political pressure. 
Transnistria was also an instrument of “creating an incentive” for Moldova’s 
participation in CIS programs given Russia’s ability to provoke internal separatist 
movements as means to undermine the independence of the former Soviet 
periphery. The fact that Russia has recently rejected the implication of the EU in 
Transnistria reveals that Moscow is not yet ready to accept European presence and 
influence in the former Soviet Union (except Baltic States) that has been declared an 
exclusive zone of Russian interests. This zone of influence, also known as the “near 
abroad”, covers all the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and is 
artificially maintained by Russia, given its interests in the region. In other words, as 
the IPP wrote, the CIS is the creature of Russian and pro-Russian elites and political 
circles that are still influenced by the imperial geopolitical and geo-economic 
chimeras.97 Moldova’s entrance into the CIS was a result of confused political identity 
of its leading class that fought for a niche in a region it was familiar with, failing thus 
in engaging irreversibly Moldova on its road “back to Europe”.
The CIS is an outdated organization that many member states try to replace by 
bilateral agreements or by sub-regional organizations. After more than a decade of 
its existence, it is clear that the expectations of those who favored Moldova’s 
integration into this regional structure turned out to be exaggerated and even wrong. 
The situation of the Baltic states is a case in point – they have consciously rejected 
the invitation to join Russian “initiative” and are forming at the moment the first wave 
of the EU eastward enlargement (accordingly having a good record of economic 
reforms), in contrast to all other CIS member states, whose area of foreign economic 
relations have worsened during these years. 
                                                                                                                                              
96 Ungureanu, O., “The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the prospect of the inclusion of the 
Republic of Moldova”, South-East Europe Review, Quarterly of the Hans-Böckler-Foundation, p. 129-
139, Issue 04/2000 
97 ”The Republic of Moldova and European Integration”, Institute for Public Policy, Chişinău, 2002
56
Moldova does not need the CIS, since this is not a viable tool for promoting 
economic integration (Chişinău’s main important goal), especially that the bilateral 
relationship with Russia is the one that counts in its Eastern orientation. On the other 
hand, it is now clear that Moldova will have to choose between the CIS or European 
Integration at a stage. However, an eventual denunciation by Moldova of its quality of 
CIS member will be perceived as an anti-Russian act since it will bring about its 
moving-off or even complete leave out of Russia’s “near abroad” – a fact that 
Moscow is not keen to accept at all, although it has announced its wish for the region 
to become more integrated within the European system. Hence, one can notice 
Russia’s duplicity in foreign affairs: while Moscow is withdrawing from the main 
important conventions and agreements of the CIS, it does not wish the other 
republics to leave some of the community’s programmes because that will run 
counter to its influence in the region. Moldova will have to bear in mind its economic, 
energetic and political dependence on Russia and the unpredictable character of the 
consequences that might occur if it decides to cease its CIS membership. Moldova’s 
departure should not attract economic losses since the economic agreements are not 
being fulfilled; yet economic sanctions might be run by Russia in its attempt to hinder 
an eventual decision in this respect. 
Given the fact that the CIS countries are still important for Moldova’s economy 
and that the prospect of EU membership (including the opening of the Union markets 
through a Free Trade Agreement) is still a long journey, authorities in Chişinău 
should start a gradual re-orientation towards the European Union since it will find 
solutions to its problems in Brussels rather than within the CIS in the long term. 
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CONCLUSIONS
The foreign policy exercised by the Republic of Moldova after its independence 
denoted a conceptual indecision of political leaders regarding the prospects of the 
country and a failure to determine a clear strategy of Moldova's anchorage in a 
system that would have created favourable external circumstances for its successful 
transition and reformation. In contrast to East-Central European countries and the 
Baltic States, which declared NATO and EU membership to be their primary foreign-
policy objective, Moldova hesitated in sending clear messages regarding her 
European aspirations to the Western capitals of the European Union and other big 
players in the international arena, such as the United States. Also, Romanian 
diplomacy failed to outline to the inexperienced and new political elites of Chişinău 
the objective of European Integration as being the optimal way for the establishment 
of a modern and prosperous state. As a result, Moldova failed to gain the support of 
the European and international community for a future membership of the Union. 
Accordingly, Moldova did not benefit from a massive financial assistance for its 
economic and political restructuring, it being included in the TACIS aid programme of 
the EU, rather than the PHARE programme as in the case of the East-Central 
countries. The choice to join the Commonwealth of Independent States drove the 
country away from the processes of European Integration. This CIS membership did 
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not serve as an incentive for Moldova's democratic development the same way in 
which the prospect of EU membership did in relation to its applicants from CEEC and 
the Baltic region. 
Moldova's capacity to outline its foreign-policy priorities was restrained and 
undermined by the two problems that marked its independence – the conflict in the 
breakaway region of Transnistria and Russian military presence on its territory with 
its huge stockpiles of munitions. By and large, the region was de-facto extirpated 
from the rest of the country after the 1992 war in which the separatist administration 
of Tiraspol enjoyed unconditional support from Moscow. A decade after the eruption 
of the conflict it has become clear that the current negotiators' format is unable and
rather unwilling to solve the crisis, and that only the involvement of other external 
factors, such as the European Union, could contribute to a viable solution of the 
conflict. The separatist conflict in Transnistria is formally an internal problem of the 
Republic of Moldova since the internationally recognized central government does 
not control a part of its territory. However, in my opinion, the conflict has a geo-
political and international nature, given the intervention of the Russian Army which 
aims to preserve the influence of the Russian Federation in the region (a fact 
acknowledged by high level politicians in Moscow) and the uninterrupted political, 
financial, diplomatic, military and technical support given to the Tiraspol leaders by 
the Russian authorities. 
The issue of European integration and EU membership as a strategic objective 
for Moldova's foreign affairs became an increasingly frequent occurrence only in the 
late 1990s when the pro-European and reformist government of Ion Sturza was 
installed. Before and after that time, Moldova exercised an unsteady and confused 
foreign policy and EU-Moldova relations developed slowly. In my view, Moldova 
might be characterized by identity schizophrenia, politically speaking, since it pledges 
for simultaneous political and economic integration within both the European and the 
Euro-Asiatic space, one having its capital in Brussels and the other in Moscow. This 
has complicated the situation especially since the discourse of "common values" 
between the two communities has been replaced with the one of "economic 
pragmatism", thus emphasising the non-European character of the Moscow-led 
community from a political and conceptual perspective. 
European rhetoric in high-level politics of the Republic of Moldova became less 
visible, authorities in Chişinău being seriously constrained by Moscow's interests and 
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leverage in the region. Moldova does not yet have European political elites capable 
of representing a viable alternative and opposition to the Communist Party and other
left-wing forces which favour the Eastern vector of external relations. The lack of 
continuity and consequence in the policy of European integration, as well as the 
inexistence of a coordinated structure of activities in this field, have led to a situation 
in which a large part of the population is ambiguous about the meaning of EU 
membership and the advantages which European community integration might bring.
Hence, Moldovan society cannot properly evaluate the need to support reforms, even 
if they are painful, in order to achieve fully-fledged membership of the European 
Union. I think that Moldova will have to make a choice at a certain point between the 
EU and the Eastern orientation (by which I mean the CIS), since the Eastern 
orientation inhibits Moldova's European aims. If it chooses integration into the 
Eastern community, Romania, as the only neighbour that is included in the eastward 
enlargement process of the EU, will have to serve as a locomotive for Moldova on its 
journey "back to Europe", the same way in which it acted successfully when Moldova 
declared its wish to become a member of the Stability Pact - the most important 
integrative process in South-Eastern Europe that left an open widow for Moldova's 
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